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The reproductive rights movement has fought many uphill battles
for the rights of women to decide how to use their bodies in matters of
sex and reproduction. Since the earliest battles over access to
contraception, control over women's bodies and sexuality has been
contested terrain where reproductive rights advocates have used
autonomy and liberty arguments in attempts to stake out space for
women to determine their reproductive lives. During periods of victory
in the courts of justice and public opinion, women have experienced
fewer barriers to accessing abortion and have benefited from a richer,
more nuanced understanding of the conditions required for truly
unconstrained decision-making about reproductive and sexual health.
During periods of backlash and retrenchment, women have suffered
burdensome restrictions on access to critical services, as the concept of
reproductive autonomy has been whittled away by legislators, judges,
and prosecutors. Throughout these ups and downs, the debate has
unfolded with abortion at the center of the struggle for reproductive
freedom. To many of us who have grown up in the reproductive rights
movement-or who have studied its victories and losses in the context of
other civil and human rights struggles of the twentieth century-this
seems fairly unremarkable, or at least inevitable, given the history of
abortion in the United States. But, as a newly emerged reproductive
justice movement has recognized, to speak of reproductive freedom as if
synonymous with unfettered access to abortion is to convey an overly
narrow notion of reproduction. Reproductive rights as commonly
understood in American society today emphasize the right to be free
from unwanted reproduction-through the availability of contraception
and abortion-at the expense of the freedom to reproduce and freedom
within reproduction. Recognition that the essence of reproductive
freedom for many women is the freedom to have and care for a child-
whether through adoption, reproductive technology, an adequate social
safety net, or simply in the absence of coercive measures such as
sterilization-has inspired advocates within marginalized communities to
articulate a broader notion of reproductive justice.' But many continue
to view freedom within reproduction-the rights of women during
pregnancy and childbirth-as an entirely different arena.
One consequence of the cordoning off of pregnancy and childbirth
from other forms of sexual and reproductive empowerment-and from
human rights in general-is that many women are unaware of their rights
1. See, e.g., A New Vision for Reproductive Justice, ASIAN COMMUNITIES FOR
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE (2005), http://www.reproductivejustice.org/download/ACRJA
New Vision.pdf, Loretta J. Ross, Sarah L. Brownlee, Ddzon Dixon Diallo & Luz
Rodriguez, The "Sistersong Collective": Women of Color, Reproductive Health and
Human Rights, 17 AM. J. HEALTH STUDIES, 79, 79 (2001).
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in childbirth. A 2002 study by the Maternity Center Association (now
called Childbirth Connection), which surveyed over 1,500 women about
their recent birth experiences, found that only 62% of respondents said
they had fully understood their right to receive complete explanations of
any procedure, drug, or test offered to them during pregnancy and
childbirth, and only 66% of respondents said they had fully understood
their right to refuse any procedure, drug, or test offered.2 As medical
technology has advanced, the implications of being uninformed have
multiplied. A woman who enters the hospital to give birth may face a
series of possible medical interventions, from electronic fetal monitoring
to induction to cesarean surgery, with dozens of potential combinations
of other interventions along the way. Often, medical intervention during
childbirth is life-saving, but at other times it is medically unnecessary, or
may even compound labor complications. One area of particular
controversy in today's hospitals and doctors' offices is the availability of
vaginal birth after cesarean surgery ("VBAC") for women who have
previously given birth by cesarean and wish to deliver subsequent babies
vaginally. After a period in the 1990s when VBAC was promoted as a
relatively low-risk alternative to repeat cesarean surgery and the number
of successful VBACs increased significantly, the last several years have
seen a reversal in the trend. The decline in VBAC rates is not simply a
function of women opting for cesareans over vaginal delivery but is
rather, at least in part, the result of a growing number of hospitals that
refuse to accept women who intend to have VBACs and physicians who
refuse to attend such births. A recent survey found that more than 800
hospitals-in every state of the United States-have banned VBAC, with
women served by smaller and more rural medical facilities suffering
disproportionately from such outright refusals to perform the services
they seek. Another nearly 400 hospitals have de facto VBAC bans in
place, due to the unavailability of providers willing to attend VBACs or
rules about conditions for VBAC that are strict enough to make VBACs
highly unlikely to occur.4 The benefits and risks of different methods of
delivery vary depending on the characteristics of the individual woman.
As scientific research reveals more about the various factors influencing
2. E.R. Declercq, C. Sakala, M.P. Corry, S. Applebaum & P. Risher, Listening to
Mothers: Report of the First National U.S. Survey of Women's Childbearing Experiences
46 (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter Listening to Mothers I], available at www.matemitywise.org/
listeningtomothers.
3. International Cesarean Awareness Network, State by State VBAC Hospital
Policy Summary, http://ican-online.orgladvocacy/VBAC-hospital-policy-summary (last
visited Dec. 12, 2009) (reporting results of telephone survey that identified numbers of
hospitals with official no-VBAC policies, de facto no-VBAC policies (i.e., due to
unavailability to providers), or VBAC-supportive policies).
4. Id.
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birth outcomes, our understanding of the balance between benefits and
risks continues to evolve. In fact, the scientific research is far from clear
that repeat cesareans are always the safer option, and they certainly
cannot justify on medical safety grounds alone the wholesale restriction
on VBAC as an option for birthing women. Empirical evidence aside,
VBAC bans forgo women's ability to attempt a trial of labor and thus
should be understood to represent a major restriction on women's
reproductive freedom. By eliminating the choice of VBAC, hospitals
and providers essentially compel women to undergo major abdominal
surgery-regardless of medical necessity and the stated preference of the
individual woman herself-or choose to labor outside a hospital setting.
With four million births annually in this country, VBAC restrictions have
the potential to affect many thousands of women at a moment in their
reproductive lives when they are most vulnerable-and should be most
empowered.' Such a trend in birth practices should sound alarms for all
those who care about reproductive freedom.
VBAC restrictions constrain women's choices in childbirth and
often lead them to undergo a medical procedure they do not want. Such
a broad violation of the right to liberty and reproductive choice calls for a
legal challenge. Of course, any legal strategy to address VBAC
restrictions demands a degree of caution. The birthing process has layers
of powerful social and cultural meaning, many of which are commonly
deemed to be outside the realm of politics. But decades of feminist
thinking, writing, and activism have demonstrated how the family,
childrearing, and women's health-as well as science and medicine-are
very much sites of political contestation. A successful legal challenge
must articulate the ways in which VBAC restrictions breathe new life
into the medical profession's patriarchal roots and promote a
downgrading of women's knowledge about their own bodies. A
successful legal challenge must also tread carefully amidst several
decades of jurisprudence dealing with the legal status of fetuses and
more recent developments that have subjected pregnant women to
increasing scrutiny in the name of fetal rights. With such considerations
in mind, this article will explore the complex issues involved in a
potential legal challenge to VBAC restrictions. In Part I, I will briefly
review the history of birthing practices over the last several decades,
suggesting some political and economic factors that help explain why
VBAC has fallen in and out of favor in recent years. In Part II, I will
5. See E.R. Declercq, C. Sakala, M.P. Corry, S. Applebaum & P. Risher, Listening
to Mothers II: Report of the Second National US. Survey of Women's Childbearing
Experiences, at 8 (Oct. 2006) [hereinafter Listening to Mothers II], available at
http://www.childbirthconnection.org/listeningtomothers.
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outline how VBAC restrictions harm women and then turn in Part III to
various legal grounds on which VBAC restrictions could be challenged,
as well as a number of policy concerns supporting a formal challenge to
such restrictions. Finally, in Part IV, I address a number of
counterarguments likely to arise in the face of a challenge to VBAC
restrictions and offer an initial set of responses-grounded in law, policy,
and common sense-as to why restricting women's choices in childbirth
fails women, their babies, and their doctors.
I. TRENDS IN BIRTHING PRACTICES: VBAC IN CONTEXT
The twentieth century saw a major shift in our society's approach to
the birthing process-from a practice that took place largely in the home
and was overseen by midwives to one that occurs in a hospital setting
with doctors and nurses (and the occasional midwife) shepherding a
woman through labor and delivery.6 As such, the medicalization of birth
is a relatively recent phenomenon. The history of VBAC highlights the
extent to which cutting-edge thinking about the best way to manage
childbirth varies over time and suggests that this is an area where expert
knowledge is still in flux.
A. Growth in Cesarean Births
At the turn of the twentieth century, developments in surgical
methods, the use of anesthesia, and understanding about sterility made
cesareans a safer, more reasonable option when complications arose
during childbirth; its safety continued to improve over the course of the
century. In the 1970s, the introduction of electronic fetal monitoring
("EFM") to monitor fetal heart rate and uterine contractions was widely
believed to improve doctors' ability to predict fetal distress in labor.7
Widespread introduction of this technology led to a dramatic increase in
the cesarean rate out of concern for fetal distress, although EFM was
later shown to produce a high rate of false positives and ultimately to be
no more beneficial than frequent listening to fetal heart rate by a doctor
or nurse using a specially designed stethoscope called a fetoscope.8 The
6. See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492,
578 (1993) (discussing the "ascendance of medical birthing as the outcome of a power
struggle between doctors and midwives").
7. See JENNIFER BLOCK, PUSHED: THE PAINFUL TRUTH ABOUT CHILDBIRTH AND
MODERN MATERNITY CARE 32-33 (2008) (stating that by 1976 "almost every maternity
ward in the country had purchased one or more electronic fetal monitors and was using
them on the majority of labor and delivery patients").
8. See id. at 32-35 (detailing introduction of EFM technology and subsequent
research on its efficacy and impact on cesarean rates); A. Prentice A & T. Lind, Fetal
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rate of cesareans more than doubled from 5.0% of births in 19709 to
10.4% in 1975;o by 1980, 16.5% of babies were delivered through
cesarean surgery." Furthermore, the prevailing wisdom had always been
"once a cesarean, always a cesarean," due to concern about uterine
rupture and other complications for women who had scarring from an
earlier surgery.12 In 1980, only 3.4% of women with uterine scars from
previous cesareans delivered a subsequent baby vaginally, which meant
that the rapidly increasing cesarean rate would be compounded when
women gave birth multiple times over the course of their reproductive
lives.13  VBAC does increase the risk of uterine rupture during
childbirth. 14 While an incomplete rupture, or scar dehiscence, is often
asymptomatic and is not associated with maternal or fetal morbidity, a
complete rupture-which can occur in either a scarred or unscarred
uterus, although scarring increases the risk-may lead to sudden blood
loss and fetal distress.15  But this increased risk did not explain (or
justify) the skyrocketing rates of cesarean surgeries, so in 1980, the
National Institutes of Health convened an expert panel to discuss concern
over the rapid growth in cesareans in American birthing practices. The
panel concluded that promoting VBAC was an appropriate way to
attempt to reverse the increasing cesarean rates.16 The advantages of
Heart Rate Monitoring During Labour: Too Frequent Intervention, Too Little Benefit?, 2
THE LANCET 1375-77 (1987).
9. Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-
Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1958 (1986).
10. Sora Song, Too Posh to Push?, TIME, Apr. 19, 2004, at 58.
11. Rhoden, supra note 9, at 1958.
12. See BLOCK, supra note 7, at 87 (recalling that the dictum "once a cesarean,
always a cesarean" was first uttered by Columbia University obstetrics and gynecology
professor Edwin B. Craigin in 1916 and remained the dominant thinking for the next
sixty years).
13. P.J. Placek & S.M. Taffel, Vaginal Birth After Cesarean (VBAC) in the 1980s,
78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 512, 513, Fig. 1 (1988). About 36% of American mothers have
given birth three or more times. Carol Sakala and Maureen P. Corry, Evidence-Based
Maternity Care: What It Is and What It Can Achieve 58 (2008), available at
http://www.childbirthconnection.org/pdfs/evidence-based-matemity-care.pdf
14. See Gerard G. Nahum & Krystie Quynh Pham, Uterine Rupture in Pregnancy,
eMedicine Obstetrics and Gynecology, at tbl 1. ("Absolute Rates of Uterine Rupture for
Different Patient Subgroups") (Jan. 15, 2008); see generally Suneet P. Chauhan et al.,
Maternal and Perinatal Complications with Uterine Rupture, 189 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 408 (2003).
15. See Jeanne-Marie Guise, Marian S. McDonagh, Patricia Osterweil, Peggy
Nygren, Benjamin K. S. Chan, Mark Helfand, Systematic Review of the Incidence and
Consequences of Uterine Rupture in Women with Previous Caesarean Section, 329
B.M.J. 1, 4-6 (2004); see generally Chauhan et al., supra note 14.
16. U.S. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, CDC,
NIH PUBLICATION NO. 82-2067, CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH, NIH CONSENSUS STATEMENT 1 1
(Oct. 1981), available at http://consensus.nih.gov/1980/1980CesareanO27html.htm
[hereinafter NIH CONSENSUS STATEMENT].
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VBAC include a shorter hospital stay, faster recovery time, and lower
medical costs. 17  Accordingly, it called for those hospitals with
appropriate facilities, services, and staff for prompt cesarean birth to
"permit a safe trial of labor and vaginal delivery for women who have
had a previous low segment transverse cesarean birth."18
By the mid-1980s, obstetricians had adopted a more widespread
practice of using low transverse cuts instead of vertical incisions, and
VBACs had become more common. 19 Support for VBAC was bolstered
by new studies at the time suggesting that about 75% of women with
previous cesareans who tried to give birth vaginally would succeed, 20 as
well as continued concern about the growing rates of cesarean surgery by
public health officials and insurance companies.2 1 The World Health
Organization ("WHO") echoed concerns about high cesarean rates,
issuing guidelines that called for cesareans to constitute no more than
15% of all births and less than 9.5% of births in industrialized nations.22
In 1988, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
("ACOG") recommended that women be encouraged to have VBACs
unless there were medical reasons for the surgical option.23 Not only did
the ACOG Committee Opinion suggest that women with one low
transverse uterine scar be "counseled and encouraged" to try vaginal
delivery, but it even recommended that patients with two or more low
transverse scars "not be discouraged" from a trial of labor.24
In 1990, the VBAC rate for women who had previous cesareans had
risen to 19.9%, a dramatic increase from ten years earlier. 2 5 But in the
same year, the cesarean rate rose to 22.7% of all births; it declined
slightly during the mid-1990s, reaching its lowest point for the decade in
1996 at a rate of 20.7/o-the year when VBACs reached an all-time high
of 28.3%--but returned to 22.9% by 2000.26 VBAC rates saw a dramatic
17. See infra Part I.C & Part II.A.
18. NIH CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 16, at 11.
19. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Risk is Found in Natural Birth After Cesarean, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/05/us/a-risk-is-found-
in-natural-birth-after-caesarean.html.
20. BLOCK, supra note 7, at 87.
21. See Stolberg, supra note 19.
22. Song, supra note 10, at 58.
23. Karin Larson Hangsleben, Margaret A. Taylor & Nancy M. Lynn, VBAC
Program in a Nurse-Midwifery Service, 34 J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY 180 (July-Aug. 1989).
24. N. Clemenson, Promoting Vaginal Birth After Cesarean, 47 AM. FAM.
PHYSICIAN 139-44 (1993).
25. Fay Menacker, Trends in Cesarean Rates for First Births and Repeat Cesarean
Rates for Low-Risk Women: United States, 1990-2003, CDC, 54 NATIONAL VITAL
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33% increase from 1991 to 1996 and a subsequent 17% decline from
1996 to 1999; both trends were true across age groups and major races
and ethnicities, as well as for almost all states and for most risk factors
and complications.27 During the height of VBAC popularity, the overall
VBAC rate was highest for non-Hispanic white women and lowest for
Hispanic women, with non-Hispanic African American women falling in
the middle.28 The push to reduce the cesarean rate continued throughout
the 1990s, driven in part by awareness that the United States was out of
step with other countries, including those with lower infant mortality
rates,29 and that the U.S. cesarean rate was higher than the WHO
recommendation. 30 Nevertheless, cesarean rates continued to rise in the
early years of the twenty-first century, climbing from 22.9% in 2000 to
27.5% in 2003. In 2004, with the cesarean rate significantly higher
than the world average, the United States ranked twenty-ninth in infant
mortality among industrialized nations.32 In 2007, the United States
ranked forty-first in the world for maternal mortality.33
B. Impact ofA COG Guidelines
In 2000, a government health report announced a target VBAC rate
of 37% by 2010,34 but an important development the year before would
put this goal far out of reach. In 1999, ACOG issued new, stricter
guidelines for VBAC, which precipitated a marked decline in VBAC
27. Fay Menacker & Sally C. Curtin, Trends in Cesarean Birth and Vaginal Birth
After Previous Cesarean, 1991-99, CDC, 49 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REP. No. 13, at
1 (Dec. 27, 2001) [hereinafter NVSR 1991-99], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nvsr/nvsr49/nvsr49_13.pdf.
28. Id. at 3.
29. See BLOCK, supra note 7, at 111 (detailing how the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention set a 15% cesarean rate as a "Healthy People 2000" goal); R.
Turner, Caesarean Section Rates, Reasons for Operations Vary Between Countries, 22
FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVEs 281-82 (1990).
30. See BLOCK, supra note 7, at 111 (discussing the 1985 World Health
Organization resolution setting the ideal cesarean rate as falling between 10% and 15% of
births).
31. NVSR 1990-2003, supra note 25, at 3.
32. MARIAN F. MACDORMAN & T.J. MATTHEWS, CDC, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, RECENT TRENDS IN INFANT MORTALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 2, FIG.
2, DATA BRIEF No. 9, (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/databriefs/db09.pdf (announcing that the United States ranked twenty-ninth in
the world for infant mortality, tied with Poland and Slovakia).
33. Ashley Gosik, US. Ranks 41' in Maternal Mortality, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.seattlepi.com/national/33539 1
maternal I 3.html.
34. See Denise Grady, Trying to Avoid 2"" Cesarean, Many Find Choice Isn't
Theirs, N.Y. TIES, Nov. 29, 2004, at I [hereinafter Grady, Trying to Avoid].
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rates in the following years. Having previously called for medical
personnel to be "readily" available,36 the guidelines now announced a
"need for those institutions offering VBAC to have the facilities and
personnel, including obstetric, anesthesia, and nursing personnel
immediately available to perform emergency cesarean delivery when
conducting a trial of labor for women with a prior uterine scar."37
Previously, the guidelines for those attempting VBAC were no different
from the general standard for obstetric services, which ACOG defined as
requiring the availability of a physician to evaluate labor and perform a
cesarean surgery within thirty minutes of a decision to do so. 8 But the
new standard requiring the presence of a physician capable of performing
a cesarean during the entire VBAC trial of labor exceeded the
capabilities of many doctors. Practitioners who regularly attended
VBACs had to close their VBAC practices because they could not treat
patients in the clinic setting while attending the entire labor of a VBAC
patient at a community hospital. 3 9 The 1999 ACOG guidelines had a
"chilling effect" 40 on the ability of women to give birth vaginally if they
had previously had a cesarean surgery, with the vast majority of VBACs
available only in university and tertiary-level hospitals, 4 1 where surgeons
and anesthesiologists are continually available. A woman wishing to
have a VBAC in an area without one of these facilities must bear the
burden and expense of traveling to give birth at a medical center far from
where she has been receiving pre-natal care (if there is such a center
close enough for her to reach when labor begins), choose the riskier
option of a VBAC homebirth, or abandon the hope for a VBAC and
consent to a repeat cesarean. Declining VBAC rates reported by the
35. See generally AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS,
PRACTICE BULLETIN No. 5, VAGINAL BIRTH AFTER PREVIOUS CESAREAN DELIVERY (1999)
[hereinafter ACOG VBAC BULLETIN 1999].
36. See Grady, Trying to Avoid, supra note 34, at 1.
37. ACOG VBAC BULLETIN 1999, supra note 35.
38. Clemenson, supra note 24, at n.10 (citing Committee on Obstetrics: Maternal
and Fetal Medicine, Guidelines for Vaginal Birth After a Previous Cesarean Birth,
ACOG Committee Opinion No. 64 (1988)).
39. Michael J. Myers, ACOG's Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Standard: A Market
Restraint Without Remedy?, 49 S.D. L. REV. 529, 528 (citing Julie Barto, Impact of
Revised Policy on Vaginal Birth After Cesarean (2003) (unpublished masters
professional report, on file with the University of South Dakota) [hereinafter Barto
Report]).
40. See Grady, Trying to Avoid, supra, note 34 (quoting D. Charles Lockwood,
chairman of Yale department of obstetrics, gynecology, and reproductive sciences and
author of the 1999 ACOG VBAC guidelines).
41. World Health Organization, Unit Costs for Patient Services, http://www.who.int/
choice/costs/unit costs/en/index.html (defining tertiary-level hospital as one with
"[h]ighly specialized staff and technical equipment, e.g., cardiology, ICU and specialized
imaging units") (last visited Dec. 12, 2009).
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National Center for Health Statistics reflect this tightening of VBAC
availability: VBAC rates decreased from 23.4% in 1999 to 16.4% just
two years later and sank to 10.6% in 2003, only four years after the
ACOG guidelines were published.4 2
In 2001, the New England Journal of Medicine published a study
about risk in VBACs, especially with the use of hormones to induce
labor.4 3 Accompanied by an editorial that included strong language
warning about the risks of VBAC,44 the study provoked a vocal reaction
from birthing rights advocates who were already concerned about the
impact of the 1999 ACOG guidelines on the availability of VBAC.
Indeed, publicity about the study underscored the validity of the alarmed
reaction from the birthing community; media reporting interpreted the
NEJM study as refuting the safety of VBAC and drew links that were
suggested by the editorial but not actually supported by the study. For
example, although the study did not contain a single reported maternal
death, the New York Times coverage discussed uterine rupture as a
dangerous complication that can "kill the mother, her baby or both."45
Subsequent commentary on the study-which did not get the same level
of press coverage-suggested that the study was methodologically
questionable in that it relied only on birth certificates and hospital
discharge data to determine the risk of uterine rupture without examining
actual medical records and charts or determining the prevalence of
coding error.46 The study was criticized for containing "little new or
ground-breaking information and rel[ying] on questionable data
collection," 4 7 while the accompanying editorial was characterized as an
"extremely bold statement," especially "[c]onsidering the overwhelming
limitations of the study." 48  The study did offer one new piece of
information about the use of synthetic prostaglandins during induction,
which was found to increase the risk of uterine rupture to 2.5%.49
Nevertheless, experts such as Dr. Bruce Flamm-an obstetrician with
Kaiser Permanente and clinical professor at UC Irvine, who has written
42. NVSR 1990-2003, supra note 25, at 3.
43. M. Lydon-Rochelle, V.L. Holt, T.R. Easterling, D.P. Martin, Risk of Uterine
Rupture During Labor Among Women with a Prior Cesarean Delivery, 345 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 3-8 (2001).
44. M.F. Greene, Vaginal Delivery After Cesarean Section-Is the Risk Acceptable?,
345 NEW ENG. J. MED., 54-55 (2001).
45. Stolberg, supra note 19.
46. Bruce L. Flamm, Vaginal Birth After Cesarean and the New England Journal of
Medicine: A Strange Controversy, BIRTH 28:4, at 276-77 (Dec. 2001).
47. Jill MacCorkle, Fighting VBAC-lash: Critiquing Current Research, MOTHERING
(Jan-Feb. 2002), available at http://www.mothering.com/articles/pregnancy-birth/
cesarean_vbac/fighting.html.
48. Flamm, supra note 46, at 278.
49. Id. at 277.
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extensively about VBAC-cautioned that the study lacks sufficient
information about how the prostaglandins were administered to be able
to conclude that prostaglandin use in VBAC is dangerous.50 Otherwise,
the study's findings-that 1) the risk of uterine rupture during a planned
VBAC trial of labor is 0.5 to 1.0%;5 2) induction without prostaglandins
may cause a slightly higher rupture rate;52 and 3) nevertheless, elective
repeat cesarean does not completely eliminate all risk of rupture5 3
simply confirm previous research and do not justify the position of the
accompanying editorial.
By 2002, the International Cesarean Awareness Network (ICAN)
was reporting an increase in calls from women who were unable to find a
hospital where they could have a VBAC.54 Periodic reporting in the
aftermath of the ACOG guidelines has highlighted the impact of
ACOG's new standard. In 2004, the New York Times reported that half
of all hospitals in New Hampshire and Vermont have banned VBAC.ss
The Washington Post ran a story in 2005 about the VBAC ban adopted
by Frederick Memorial Hospital in Frederick, MD, which inspired a
media-friendly protest of mothers and children.5 6 The Listening to
Mothers survey found that when asked a hypothetical question about
choosing a cesarean in the future-even if no medical reason existed for
the surgery-women preferred vaginal birth by a margin of five to one
(83% to 16%).5 A follow-up study four years later found that 85% of
women supported the right to choose VBAC.
A 2003 study of an obstetrical and gynecological practice in a South
Dakota community with a population of 110,000 provides local
confirmation of nationwide statistics that reflect a decline in the number
of VBACs.59 In the geographical area where the study was conducted,





54. See Grady, Trying to Avoid, supra, note 34.
55. Id. (quoting Dr. Peter Cherouny, University of Vermont professor of obstetrics
and gynecology).
56. See Rob Stein, Once a C-Section, Always a C-Section?; Women Who Want to
Try Labor on Later Deliveries are Increasingly Refused, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2005, at
Al; see also Grady, Trying to Avoid, supra, note 34 (reporting protest outside Frederick
Memorial Hospital on November 9, 2004 involving approximately 50 mothers with their
children); Petition: Bring Back VBAC at Frederick Memorial Hospital, Birthing Circle of
Frederick, http://www.petitiononline.com/finhvbac/petition.html (last visited Dec. 12,
2009).
57. Listening to Mothers I, supra note 2, at 7.
58. See Listening to Mothers II, supra note 5, Executive Summary at 6.
59. Myers, supra note 39, at 529 (citing Barto Report).
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hospitals. After ACOG released its 1999 guidelines, the OB/GYN
practices adopted policies that exclude attendance by its practitioners of
elective VBACs. 6 0  The community hospitals also adopted VBAC
restrictions according to the 1999 ACOG guidelines, resulting in a whole
population without the option of VBAC. The study's author concludes
that the decline in VBACs is attributable to the ACOG guidelines:
Before the 1999 revised VBAC guidelines were released by ACOG,
family physicians throughout the service area successfully performed
VBAC deliveries unattended by OB/GYN. Under the new
standards ... [not only must there be] attendance of the family
physician responsible for monitoring the course of labor, but also an
OB/GYN trained to perform cesarean sections.61
The first Listening to Mothers survey also revealed declining access to
VBAC, finding that of the women who gave birth one to two years prior
to the study, 25% had been denied the option to have a VBAC, while
among women who gave birth in just the twelve months prior to the
study, 58% had been denied VBAC.6 2 Of all those who had been denied
VBAC, the most common reasons were medical (unrelated to fear of
rupture) (38%) and caregiver unwillingness (36%), followed by hospital
unwillingness (12%).3 There is currently no useful research on the
relationship between caregiver unwillingness and hospital unwillingness,
or the ways in which pressures on both sets of actors combine to produce
VBAC unavailability.
Another chapter in the history of cesareans came in 2003, when the
ACOG ethics committee issued an opinion finding that it is ethical for
doctors to perform "elective" cesarean surgeries as long as there is no
danger to the health of the mother or fetus. 4 The committee offered no
guidelines, claiming a lack of evidence. Although reporting in the media
has suggested that women's selfish desire to reduce the inconvenience of
childbirth has driven cesarean rates to skyrocket, the data do not support
such claims. 5 In fact, the concept of "elective" cesareans itself is
problematic in that the criteria for what constitutes "elective" are vague.
60. Id. (citing Barto Report, at 8).
61. Id. (citing Barto Report, at 16).
62. Listening to Mothers I, supra note 2, at 27.
63. Id.
64. Press Release, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, New
ACOG Opinion Addresses Elective Cesarean Controversy (Oct. 31, 2003),
http://www.acog.org/from-home/publications/pressreleases/nrl0-31-03-1.cfm.
65. See BLOCK, supra note 7, at 52 (reporting "little evidence of a significant
'patient-choice' cesarean trend"); Miriam Prez, The Myth of the Elective C-Section, RH
Reality Check (July 7, 2008), http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2008/06/27/the-myth-
elective-csection.
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For example, when HealthGrades, a company that rates the quality of
hospitals and doctors, reviewed several years of birth data across
different states to determine the frequency of what they called "patient
choice" cesareans, they arrived at the figure simply by taking all
cesareans performed before or without labor and eliminating repeat
cesareans, breeches, multiples, and any medical complications that
66warrant surgery. At no point did they interview women about how they
came to have a cesarean birth despite the fact that they fell into the "no
indicated risk" category or look at the role of billing practices in
influencing what cesareans are labeled "elective." Nor did the study
consider what role doctors might play in guiding the outcome of delivery
choice by emphasizing certain risks but not others-a phenomenon for
which there is plenty of anecdotal evidence.67 At the very least, it is
clear that the 2003 ACOG opinion contributes to an imbalance in the
options available to birthing women. The problem is not with the
availability of, and demand for, "elective" cesareans, but rather that
ACOG promotes this particular birthing choice with weak evidentiary
support, while restricting VBAC as another possible choice for women
giving birth.
C. Profit and Liability in Birthing
Commentators have suggested a number of factors contributing to
high cesarean rates, including the privileging of technological methods of
birth on the part of both patients and doctors, the pursuit of higher fees
for cesareans than vaginal deliveries, and legal defensiveness on the part
of doctors who believe performing cesareans will better protect them
from claims of malpractice should something go wrong during birth.68
Despite the healing and caretaking dimensions of practicing medicine,
"profit maximization has approximately the same presence in health care
as it does [in] banking, auto sales, lawyering, and other market
endeavors."69 In 1991, Public Citizen reported that the average cost for a
vaginal delivery was $4,720, while the cost for a cesarean surgery was
66. See BLOCK, supra note 7, at 52-53.
67. Id. at 91 (quoting a maternal-fetal medicine specialist who stated, "'I could talk
most women into either option [vaginal or cesarean delivery] if that was what I truly
wanted to do,"' in order to underscore the point that "physicians, if they have an agenda,
wield enormous power in this regard"); see also id. at 49-55.
68. See generally, e.g., BLOCK, supra note 7; Myers, supra note 39.
69. Myers, supra note 39, at 527. Indeed the role of economics as a driving force in
the provision of health care is well-documented. Id. (citing DANIEL HALEY, POLITICS IN
HEALTH: THE SUPPRESSION AND MANIPULATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (2000); JAMES P.
CARTER, M.D., RACKETEERING IN MEDICINE: THE SUPPRESSION OF ALTERNATIVES (1992);
FITZHUGH MULLAN, M.D., BIG DOCTORING IN AMERICA (2002); EUGENE D. ROBIN, M.D.,
MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH: RISKS vs. BENEFITS OF MEDICAL CARE (1984)).
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$7,826.70 Today, cesareans cost $14,000-$17,000, whereas charges for a
vaginal delivery fall in the $6,000-$8,000 range.n Cesarean surgeries
are also associated with longer hospitalization, which produces more
revenue for hospitals; women who have cesareans are also almost twice
as likely to be re-hospitalized when compared to women who have
vaginal deliveries, which in turn generates more hospital revenue. 72 A
study by Chicago researchers estimated that over the reproductive lives
of 100,000 women, there would be an estimated 117,748 cesarean
surgeries and 5,500 maternal morbid events, resulting in a total of $179
million in hospital and doctor fees. It is also worth nothing that
physician compensation is for the delivery itself, which creates a
disincentive for a provider to attend a woman in labor without reasonable
assurance that he will in fact be delivering the baby: "A family
physician is unwilling to fully attend a patient's labor with the possibility
that the obstetrician will deliver the patient by cesarean. . . . The
obstetrician is unwilling to fully attend a patient's labor only to have the
family physician deliver her vaginally." 74
The high stakes involved in practicing medicine-particularly in the
context of birth-mean obstetricians pay hefty malpractice premiums,
reaching as much as $150,000-$200,000 annually. 75 Patients' rights get
folded into a larger framework of risks and benefits analyzed by hospital
administrators and risk managers.7 6 Although a woman is unlikely to sue
after a cesarean that results in a healthy baby (and would have a hard
time proving damages if she did), a physician incurs greater legal
exposure when she honors a women's refusal of cesarean and the baby is
damaged during birth. Such cases resonate with juries, and a litigant
may claim that she did not understand the consequences of her refusal.
Such concerns contribute to the idea that a cesarean is a "strong offense
that constitutes the best defense"77 and may often influence physicians to
encourage women into consenting to surgical delivery. Distortion of the
risk involved in VBAC has led to some changes in malpractice insurance
coverage for physicians. For example, in Oklahoma, the malpractice
70. See Lucy Danziger, Parent & Child: Natural Birth vs. On-Time Delivery, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1995, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/03/garden/parent-.
child-natural-birth-vs-on-time-delivery.html?.
71. Myers, supra note 39, at 528, 531.
72. M. Lyndon-Rochelle, et al., Association Between Method of Delivery and
Maternal Re-Hospitalization, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2411-16 (2000).
73. Steven Reinerg, Routine Repeat Cesarean Delivery May not be Cost Effective,
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY (2000), available at http://www.ican-online.org/news/
050103.htm.
74. Myers, supra note 39, at 531 (citing Barto Report, at 16-17).
75. See Song, supra note 10.
76. See Rhoden, supra note 9, at 2009.
77. Id. at 2021.
968 [Vol. 114:3
2010] CHOICE IN BIRTH: PRESERVING ACCESS TO VBAC 969
insurer Physicians Liability Insurance Company (PILCO) has stopped
covering VBACs; given that PILCO has a monopoly on coverage in the
state, the policy of a single insurance company has essentially instituted a
statewide VBAC ban. The work of author and journalist Jennifer
Block suggests that insurance company demands may play a
significant-and hard to detect-role in promoting restrictive VBAC
policies. She writes about New Jersey's St. Barnabas Medical Center,
where a practice of 60 obstetricians insured by MDAdvantage has
entered into a verbal agreement with the company to stop attending
VBACs (as well as vaginal twin births). 79 The president of the group,
who was involved in creating the agreement, justified it by the need to
curb liability and said the members of the practice were informed of the
decision by "word of mouth."8 0
Successful claims resulting from unwanted cesareans are rare,
although they do sometimes arise. In 1993, a jury awarded a woman
$1.53 million for complications arising from an unwanted cesarean,
which resulted in a healthy child but serious health consequences for the
woman.81  The fact that it took the plaintiff a year to find a lawyer
willing to take her case is indicative of how minimal a threat such claims
currently pose to doctors, especially in comparison to claims for failure
to perform a cesarean. It is worth noting, however, that the range of risks
to long-term health for a woman undergoing cesarean and the number of
women who end up with an unwanted cesarean suggest that this type of
lawsuit could likely be replicated if there were lawyers willing to take on
such clients. This should not be interpreted as a call for more
litigiousness in the health care arena; rather, the point is simply to
question what might happen to the cesarean rate if feminist and
reproductive rights groups dedicated more of their resources to fighting
cases where women's constitutional rights are violated during labor and
childbirth, rather than continuing to perpetuate an artificial disjunction
between reproductive rights and birthing rights.82
78. See BLOCK, supra note 7, at 88.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Donald Chervenak, M.D., president of the St. Barnabas Medical
Center's obstetrics group practice).
8 1. Betsy A. Lehman, Woman Wins $1.53m Suit on Unwanted Cesarean, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 16, 1993, at 1.
82. See BLOCK, supra note 7, at 270 (considering "why mainstream American
feminist groups have been slow to recognize the right to reproduce along with the right to
be free from reproducing"); id. at 260 ("'Groups say they're about reproductive rights,
but it's really not about the full spectrum of reproductive rights; it's all just about
abortion,"' quoting an activist who lobbied women's health, reproductive rights, and
feminist legal organizations to include VBAC on their agendas). See generally id. at 227,
267-71.
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Some research has suggested that, regardless of media hype
suggesting otherwise, the risk of malpractice claims does not alter the
treatment choices of obstetricians, who face one of the highest rates of
malpractice lawsuits among medical specialties. But despite some
conflicting views about the impact of malpractice on doctors' practices in
the delivery room, there is less ambiguity about the extent to which the
1999 ACOG standard was "embedded in the politics of the medical
malpractice insurance crises., 84 A 2003 assessment of existing research
performed by HHS's Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
reported that the "crisis in malpractice rates is decreasing the availability
of maternity care providers and raising concerns that patients may have
limited options."85 Popular reporting on the issue reinforces the idea that
the "real death knell to VBACs was the malpractice crisis," with doctors
and hospitals freely acknowledging that fear of lawsuits has driven their
decisions to ban VBACs in response to the 1999 ACOG guidelines. 86
Other research suggests that there has been insufficient empirical
study of the impact that legal arrangements have on the availability and
occurrence of VBAC. The AHRQ assessment identified flaws in various
studies looking at the influence of malpractice issues on VBAC or repeat
cesareans, although the AHRQ did conclude that VBAC rates are higher
in teaching hospitals, as compared to private, community, regional, or
other non-teaching hospitals, which supports the conclusion of the South
Dakota study.8 7
This brief history of the availability and prevalence of both
cesareans and VBACs suggests the choice of delivery methods is a
rapidly evolving area. The "accepted wisdom" has changed enormously
over short periods of time, subject to developments in science and
medical technology, as well as shifting views about birth. Knowing that
reliable scientific research is limited in this area suggests that restrictions
on women's freedom to choose how to give birth rest on flimsy grounds.
We should instead learn from earlier periods when new technology and
best practices were incorporated into dominant thinking about birthing
practices and maintain a continued openness to variation and choice in
childbirth that meets the needs of different women.
83. See Beomsoo Kim, Current Research on Medical Malpractice Liability: The
Impact of Malpractice Risk on the Use of Obstetrics Procedures, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 79
(2007).
84. Myers, supra note 39, at 530.
85. J-M Guise, M. McDonagg & J. Hashima, Vaginal Birth After Cesarean (VBAC),
Evidence Report/Technology Assessment, No. 71, Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, HHS, AHRQ Publication No. 03-E018, at 1 (March 2003) [hereinafter AHRQ
Evidence Report].
86. Grady, Trying to Avoid, supra note 34 (quoting Dr. Lockwood).
87. AHRQ Evidence Report, supra note 85, at 4.
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II. HARMS OF VBAC RESTRICTIONS
The negative impacts of VBAC restrictions can be loosely
organized into two categories of harms: increased risk from unnecessary
surgery and an undermining of women's autonomy. While these two
categories are certainly related and at times are closely interwoven in
their significance for women's lives, teasing out the dynamics of both
sets of harms helps to expose the full implications of VBAC restrictions
and understand why they should not be allowed to stand.
A. Increased Risks from Unnecessary Surgery
The fact that a cesarean is major surgery seems often to be glossed
over in the context of birth. While it may be true that many women find
the pain and discomfort resulting from a cesarean to be a small price to
pay for the birth of their child, it does a disservice to women to minimize
the intrusiveness of this form of abdominal surgery. Women who do not
receive proper counseling about cesareans as major surgery may not fully
understand the implications of surgical birth and be left feeling powerless
and regretful that their birth experience was so heavily medicated by
drugs. Women may also be less likely to seek assistance with the
physical and emotional aftermath of a cesarean birth, influenced by the
notion that cesareans avoid the worst hardships of labor and therefore
that the postpartum difficulties they experience are problems with them
individually and not the reasonable effects of a birthing process that
involved major surgery. Even the language commonly used to refer to
the procedure--often referred to as "cesarean section" instead of
"cesarean surgery," or among providers as "to section a woman"-
obscures the similarity of cesareans to other major abdominal surgeries,
for which we require a much more rigorous showing that the likely
benefit outweighs potential harm. While cesarean birth is the right
choice for some women, it is critical that advocacy of different birth
methods reflects the idea that a cesarean is major surgery.
The significance of viewing cesareans as major surgery is
particularly apparent in the context of VBAC restrictions, which often
have the effect of compelling women to consent to surgery. Even where
alternative locations exist within a reasonable distance where a woman
could give birth by VBAC, the restrictions on VBAC at her hospital of
choice may have the effect of coercing her into having surgery. All
surgery entails a degree of risk, which must be considered with particular
care when the proposed surgery is not medically required. According to
ACOG, "cesarean delivery significantly increased a woman's risk of
experiencing a pregnancy-related death (35.9 deaths per 100,000
deliveries with a live-birth outcome) compared to a woman who
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
delivered vaginally (9.2 deaths per 100,000)." " While other studies
examined by the AHRQ found no difference in maternal death rates
between a trial of labor and "elective" repeat cesarean (i.e. where the
group of women studied all have had previous cesareans), they did report
increased rates of infection overall in "elective" repeat cesarean versus
trial of labor.8 9 The Coalition for Improving Maternity Services (CIMS)
reports that women have a five to seven times greater risk of death with
cesareans than with vaginal birth.90  Specific complications include
surgical injury to the bladder, uterus, and blood vessels, as well as
increased rates of infertility, miscarriage, and placenta previa, a condition
where the placenta covers all or part of the opening to the cervix.9' One
to two percent of all cesareans lead to infection, damage to other organs
during surgery, or severe bleeding.92 One in ten women report difficulty
with normal activities two months after a cesarean birth, and twice as
many women need re-hospitalization as those who give birth vaginally.93
The Listening to Mothers survey found that women who had cesareans
were more likely than women who had vaginal deliveries to experience
particular health concerns after birth, such as abdominal pain, bladder
and bowel difficulties, headaches, and backaches.94
An unnecessary cesarean may also pose additional risks to the fetus.
Although the research is thin, studies report that one to two babies per
100 get cut during a cesarean birth.95 Additionally, some research
indicates that babies born by cesarean are 50% more likely to have low
Apgar scores than babies delivered vaginally, are five times more likely
to require assistance breathing, and are five times more likely to be
admitted to intermediate or intensive care. 96  Research on labor and
delivery suggests that amniotic fluid is squeezed from the baby's lungs
88. Myers, supra note 39, at 527 (quoting International Cesarean Awareness
Network, ICAN Criticizes ACOG Statement on Ethical Cesareans (Nov. 10, 2003)).
89. AHRQ Evidence Report, supra note 85, at 3.
90. Myers, supra note 39, at 532 n.31 (citing Coalition for Improving Maternity
Services, The Risks of Cesarean Delivery to Mother and Baby: ACIMS Fact Sheet).
91. Id.at532n.32.
92. See Song, supra note 10.
93. Myers, supra note 39, at 532, nn.33-34 (citing M. Lyndon-Rochelle et al.,
Association Between Method of Delivery and Maternal Re-hospitalization, 283 J. AM.
MED. Ass'N 2411-16 (2000)).
94. Listening to Mothers I, supra note 2, at 6.
95. Myers, supra note 39, at 533 n.37 (citing M.A. Van Harm et al, Maternal
Consequences of Cesarean section, A Retrospective Study of Intra-Operative and
Postoperative Maternal Complications of Cesarean Section During a 10-Year Period,
EUR. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY REPROD. BIOLOGY 1-6 (1997)).
96. Myers, supra note 39, at 532, nn.33-34 (citing M. Lyndon-Rochelle et al.,
Association Between Method of Delivery and Maternal Re-hospitalization, 283 J. AM.
MED. Ass'N 2411-16 (2000)).
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during vaginal delivery, making breathing easier after birth.97 Other
studies have concluded that there is insufficient evidence to draw
conclusions about the impact of cesarean surgeries on Apgar scores or
respiratory issues.9 8 There has also yet to be a study measuring infant
death rates directly attributable to choice of delivery method.99
B. Sacrificing Advances in Feminism and Patient Autonomy
VBAC restrictions also pose a serious harm to autonomy, the
importance of which has been recognized in the medical context through
the struggle of patients' rights advocates and women's health advocates,
who have fought to have basic human dignity respected by a medical
profession whose expert position and patriarchal roots have often
resulted in a "we know best" attitude about the health and lives of
women patients. Women who carry their pregnancies to term generally
want what is best for the fetus and will accept medical treatment
accordingly, but there are nevertheless a range of significant reasons why
a woman may refuse treatment. The medical profession's potent
combination of superior expertise and patriarchal bias can produce
distrust of women's knowledge about their own bodies. This distrust is
reflected in the way commentators discuss the reasons a woman might
have for refusing to consent to a cesarean. Women are said to
base their decisions on religious beliefs, fear of stigmatization, fear of
surgery, fear of dying, disbelief of the medical diagnosis, and their
desire not to have the baby. Women may also refuse because of the
undesirability of an abdominal scar, because of a pathological denial
of pregnancy (especially teenagers), or because of depression or other
mental disability. 00
Another writer explains that "some may refuse because of religious
beliefs, eccentric preferences, idiosyncratic weightings of the values at
issue, fear of surgery, or desire not to have the child."o' He also
mentions feelings of guilt, concerns about interference with early
bonding, medical complications, unappealing scars, the need for
subsequent cesareans, and greater expense.10 2 What these descriptions
97. See D. Ashley Hill, M.D., Issues and Procedures in Women's Health: Vaginal
Birth After Cesarean (VBAC) (Dec. 18, 2003), http://www.obgyn.net/womenlarticles/
VBAC dah.htm.
98. AHRQ Evidence Report, supra note 85, at 3.
99. Id.
100. Joel Jay Finer, Toward Guidelines for Compelling Cesarean Surgery: Of Rights,
Responsibility, and Decision Authenticity, 76 MINN. L. REv. 239, 276 (1991).
101. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 455 n.162 (1983).
102. Id. at 454.
2010] 973
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
have in common is that they are heavily fear-based or seemingly
superficial. What they do not contemplate is that a woman has superior
knowledge of her own body and that her desire for a vaginal delivery
may have its roots in simply knowing what is best for her, along with
other moral, ethical, or religious beliefs. They do not acknowledge the
possibility that a woman who desires more children will suffer a much
higher degree of risk during subsequent births and may abandon future
childbearing plans. Furthermore, the lumping together of concerns about
safety and reasons such as the undesirability of a scar diminishes
legitimate exploration of the risks involved and implies that such
concerns are not completely rational. There is certainly no room for the
possibility that rather than representing disregard for the baby's well-
being, the refusal of a cesarean might actually suggest "rejection of a
demeaning vision of one's self and one's body and a claiming of one's
right to human dignity, respect, and autonomy."' 03
When pregnant women refuse treatment, the reasons are often very
personal and may be hard for a third party to comprehend, which leads to
judgment and suspicion of the woman. To distinguish a "good" reason
for refusing treatment from a "bad" reason, or a "rational' choice from an
"irrational" one, is a highly subjective endeavorl 04 -and one which often
does not favor the woman who questions medical authority or dares to
listen to her body over the advice of doctors. In her discussion of
pregnancy limitations on living wills, Katherine Taylor identifies a "legal
and cultural trend in which pregnant women are no longer trusted to obey
the dictates of the age-old ideology of 'selfless motherhood.',
10 5
Medical authority must be leveraged to reinforce the idea that a woman's
obligation to her fetus trumps her interest in autonomy.10 6 Paternalism
provides the vehicle for communicating this "correct" set of priorities to
a pregnant woman: "if you truly understood, you wouldn't insist on a
VBAC-you're resisting the cesarean out of fear or a state of denial, and
that's wrong." But paternalism is hard to contain once it is mobilized to
justify intrusive action. In the birthing context, the risk of resulting harm
to a women's autonomy and dignity is too great to succumb to a moral
order that "subordinat[es women .. .] as both moral actors and
citizens."1 07
103. Ehrenreich, supra note 6, at 553.
104. Lawrence J. Nelson, Brian P. Buggy & Carol J. Weil, Forced Medical Treatment
of Pregnant Women: "Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest," 37
HASTINGs L.J. 703, 720 (1985); Ehrenreich, supra note 6, at 523.
105. Katherine A. Taylor, Compelling Pregnancy at Death's Door, 7 COLUM J.
GENDER& L. 85, 90 (1997).
106. Id. at 159.
107. Id. at 158.
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It is a mistake to minimize the potential harms of VBAC restrictions
under the theory that a woman's labor lasts several hours, or at most
several days, whereas the baby she births will be with her for a lifetime.
Such rationalization underestimates the extent to which the act of giving
birth itself is a transformative event for many women, one which elicits
emotions that a woman may not have experienced at any other point in
her life. 08  Some women find that the heightened sensitivity they
experience while giving birth makes them vulnerable to experiences that
might not hold the same significance in another context.' 09 These
experiences may stay with a woman long after giving birth and have a
transformative effect on her sense of self. In this sense, pregnancy
restrictions may perpetuate a sense of alienation on the part of the
woman giving birth. As one commentator observes, when women are
"defined ... by false interpretations of pregnancy with which they
cannot identify, and which render their own interests virtually invisible,
[they] may be psychically injured, experiencing a profound and harmful
alienation from their community, from the state, and even from
themselves."' 10  Framed differently, consider the experience of a
pregnant woman whose doctor tried to convince her to consent to a
cesarean by comparing her uterus to a "hydrogen bomb."'11 It is not hard
to imagine that rather than pacify a woman's concerns about choosing a
surgical delivery, such a statement could easily damage the trust a
woman has in her doctor and strengthen her adherence to an
understanding of her body and pregnancy that is an intimate, organic,
positive part of her-rather than a dangerous weapon posing a deadly
threat. Some researchers have begun to study "birth trauma," concluding
that anywhere from 1.5% to 6% of women suffer from post-traumatic
stress disorder resulting from their birthing experiences-with a strong
correlation to high levels of medical intervention that leave women
feeling powerless.112 One nursing professor who has spent 20 years
researching the psychological dimensions of childbirth writes about how
many of the women she has studied analogize their birth trauma to rape,
108. See generally, e.g., MARSHALL H. KLAUS, JOHN H. KENNELL & PHYLLIS H.
KLAUS, THE DOULA BOOK: HOW A TRAINED LABOR COMPANION CAN HELP YOU HAVE A
SHORTER, EASIER, AND HEALTHIER BIRTH (2d. ed. 2002); PAM ENGLAND & ROB
HOROWITZ, BIRTHING FROM WITHIN: AN EXTRA-ORDINARY GUIDE TO CHILDBIRTH
PREPARATION (1998).
109. See, e.g., RACHEL GUREVICH, THE DOULA ADVANTAGE 10-15 (2003).
110. Taylor, supra note 105, at 156.
111. Lehman, supra note 81 (reporting on the legal case of a woman whose doctor
reneged on his agreement to assist her VBAC too close to her due date for her to find
another doctor willing to support her VBAC attempt).
112. See BLOCK, supra note 7, at 145 (citing Cheryl Tatano Beck, Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder Due to Childbirth, 53 NURSING RESEARCH 216, no. 4 (2004)).
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describing how they felt physically violated and stripped of their
dignity." 3 Others have written about the sense of anger and alienation
experienced upon learning about pregnancy restrictions on living wills,
which essentially void the preferences of a pregnant woman and her
family in favor of a fetus when confronted with difficult decisions about
life-saving or life-prolonging treatment.l 14 The harm evoked here is
intangible and indeterminate because it affects one's core sense of self-
a notion that is resistant to being quantified-but this indeterminacy does
not make it any less real. Ceding control of one's reproductive processes
can be hugely disempowering and "deeply destructive.""' 5 A physician's
use of coercion to enforce moral convictions about the optimal way for a
woman to give birth-without using her knowledge of her own body to
guide the decision-making-is rights-violative. Such use of force is
disproportionate to the harm that might be caused by a lack of treatment,
when the decision to decline a cesarean is a fully informed one.
Oftentimes in the debate about forced cesareans--or about
compelling women to abide by any number of rules specifically because
they are pregnant-arguments are framed in a way that leaves room for
only one right answer. The question "Is the state prohibited from
compelling surgery as the only means to save the life of a verge-of-birth
fetus, given that such surgery is voluntarily entered into by nearly a
million women per year, and involves little more than minimal risk of
death or serious complication?"ll 6 need not even be framed as a question
because in assuming certain facts about women's experiences (and
ignoring others), it provides the answer in the very same breath. Not
only does it conflate all the reasons why women have cesareans and then
rely on them without differentiation to diminish concerns about the risk
involved, but it trivializes the fact that cesareans are major abdominal
surgery, which individuals may have a number of legitimate reasons for
wanting to avoid. The question also assumes that when a woman refuses
a cesarean, she is necessarily pitting her interests against those of her
fetus, without leaving any room for the strong possibility that her
decision is based on personal knowledge of what is best for them both.
Ignoring this possibility-and enshrining it in professional guidelines
and hospital policies in a way that restricts a woman's ability to give
113. Id. ("Everyone was rejoicing, meanwhile I'm lying on the table thinking I'm
being raped. Raped on the delivery table [with vagina having just been torn with forceps
after only an hour of pushing], with everybody watching.").
114. Taylor, supra note 85, at 157 n.233 (describing one women's anger "that I, and
even my family, didn't 'count' for anything if I happened to be pregnant").
115. Ehrenreich, supra note 6, at 495 (citing ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN 176
(1976)).
116. Finer, supra note 100, at 264.
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birth in the best way possible for her-strikes at the heart of a women's
right to respect for her autonomy.
It is important to notice that the language of autonomy and rights
complicates our understanding of how VBAC restrictions infringe on the
autonomy that is so deeply valued in our society. This particular trend in
birthing practices is frequently referred to as a "VBAC ban," suggesting
a ban on a particular type of medical procedure. Not only must we ask
whether referring to birth as a "procedure" contributes to excessively
medicalized views of birth and perpetuates an image of childbirth where
a woman is struggling against-rather than working with-her body, but
we must also consider whether conceptualizing such policies as
procedure bans makes it more difficult to articulate why they are rights-
violative. In contrast, if we frame VBAC policies as restrictions on
pregnant women who refuse to surrender their rights to medical decision-
making when giving birth, it may be easier to understand the impact of a
restrictive policy on an individual woman's autonomy. The relevant
question becomes: does a woman lose certain constitutional rights when
she goes into labor and gives birth?-and the answer should be clear.
Continuing to grapple with the nuances of how VBAC restrictions-and
resistance to them-are framed is a critical component of challenging
those restrictions and promoting an approach to childbirth that respects
women's autonomy.
III. CHALLENGING VBAC RESTRICTIONS
Restrictive VBAC policies diminish women's autonomy by limiting
their options for childbirth and by justifying such restriction on factors
that mischaracterize or ignore certain critical aspects of their
childbearing experiences. Specifically, VBAC restrictions deny women
the opportunity to attempt a VBAC; in practice, a woman's willingness
to consent to cesarean without attempting a trial of labor may be what
enables her to access physician care and hospital services. This
constitutes an undue burden on women's reproductive decision-making.
U.S. Constitutional law recognizes the right to make decisions about
establishing a family and controlling the upbringing of one's children, as
well as the right of a woman to make decisions about her reproductive
life. Recent jurisprudence in the abortion-rights context has arguably
whittled away the expansiveness with which one might otherwise
interpret these rights,"'7 but the constitution nevertheless protects a
woman's right to privacy and procreative liberty. A lawsuit challenging
a restrictive VBAC policy would have to target publicly-funded hospitals
117. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164-65 (2007).
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in order to satisfy the state action requirement." A strong challenge
would include both a woman who was injured by a hospital's refusal to
allow her to attempt a VBAC and a doctor who, although willing to assist
women in VBAC births, is prevented from doing so by hospital policy.
In addition to harming women, VBAC restrictions limit a doctor's ability
to practice medicine according to professional ethical standards in a way
that avoids harm; they also interfere impermissibly with the doctor-
patient relationship. Although the doctor's role in such litigation is
important, I will focus here on the arguments relevant to the woman's
constitutional claim in an attempt to tease out the tensions inherent in the
current doctrine on reproductive freedom.
A. Constitutional Grounds
The constitutional right to privacy is grounded in a series of cases
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, although the earliest recognition
of the right to bodily autonomy in U.S. case law is considered to be a
late-nineteenth century tort case where the Supreme Court held that "[n]o
right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person. . . ."'19 The Court first contemplated liberty in the context
of family life in the 1920s, with decisions that defined liberty as
including the right "to establish a home and bring up children"1 20 and
prohibiting state action that interferes with the rights of parents to "direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control." 2 '
Although not directly on point, these cases contribute to an
understanding of individual autonomy that includes a wide scope of
freedom to shape one's own family life as one wishes. Just a few years
later, Justice Brandeis articulated the right to privacy as "the right to be
let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." 2 2
118. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ("[T]he principle has
become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that
of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.").
119. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
120. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 390 (1923).
121. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). But see Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S.. 113, 170 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Abele v. Markle, 351 F.Supp. 224,
227 (D. Conn. 1972)) (describing impact of pregnancy, birth and child-rearing on women
as "of a far greater degree of significance and personal intimacy than the right[s] . ..
protected in Pierce . .. or . .. Meyer. . . .").
122. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (1928).
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Later cases deal more directly with procreative rights. In Skinner v.
Oklahoma,12 3 the Court struck down a statute that ordered compulsory
sterilization as a criminal punishment, finding that the law "involves one
of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." 2 4 The Court
further strengthened the right to procreate in two cases that struck down
statutes regulating the use of birth control. 12 5 The Court was clear about
the meaning of privacy in the realm of procreation: "[i]f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." 2 6
VBAC restrictions put women who intend to have larger families at
unnecessary risk by subjecting them to cesarean surgeries and thereby
compounding the likelihood that they will experience complications
during future pregnancies. For some women this increased risk will
cause them to forego having more children, making the VBAC
restriction an unconstitutional interference with the "decision whether to
bear or beget a child." Furthermore, such constitutional protection does
not exist in a vacuum but rather includes within it the idea that access to
the conditions that enable exercise of the right is itself also part of the
constitutional guarantee. In Carey v. Population Services Int'l,127 the
Court struck down a New York statute prohibiting distribution of
"nonmedical" contraceptives to persons over 16 years old except through
a licensed pharmacist, finding the prohibition to violate the constitution
"not because there is an independent fundamental 'right of access to
contraceptives,' but because such access is essential to exercise of the
constitutionally protected right of decision in matters of childbearing that
is the underlying foundation of the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v.
Baird, and Roe v. Wade."1 28 Like the condom law at issue in Carey,
hospital VBAC restrictions undermine access to the conditions necessary
to exercise the "constitutionally protected right of decision in matters of
childbearing"1 29 that is well-established in constitutional jurisprudence.
The Court has also recognized that cases involving pregnancy
contemplate a notion of privacy that differs from the privacy at issue in
123. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
124. Id. at 541.
125. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
126. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
127. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
128. Id. at 688-89.
129. Id.
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the contexts of marital intimacy, marriage, contraception, or education
because the "pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy."13 0
Thus, while a woman's right to privacy means she has the right to make
decisions about her reproductive life, the Court in Roe v. Wade
recognized that-at least in the context of abortion-the state has an
interest in the fetus that will justify certain restrictions on abortion. 3 1
Although the Court's abortion doctrine is certainly relevant to the
birthing right context because it is essential to understanding the scope of
reproductive freedom protected by the constitution, there is a distinction
between restrictions on a woman's ability to terminate a pregnancy-
where there is no uncertainty that the outcome will be destruction of the
fetus-and restrictions on a woman's ability to give birth the way she
wants to-where there is a much smaller possibility of harm to the fetus,
and even less possibility of death. In the context of pregnancy, the state
is not filling the same role as it does in the abortion context, where it
serves as the last obstacle to termination of the pregnancy. At the very
least, this distinction suggests that the state's interest in protecting the
fetus during pregnancy should not trump the woman's interest in giving
birth according to her physical, emotional, and spiritual needs, as she
determines them for herself and for the fetus she carries.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey'32 , the Court upheld Roe's central
premise that abortion is a fundamental right, but it adopted the "undue
burden" standard for deciding when the "power of the State reach[es]
into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." 33 The
Court explained that an undue burden is a restriction that "has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 34 Most importantly for the
purposes of a VBAC challenge, the Court held that a "statute with this
purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the
interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free
choice, not hinder it."' 3 ' Although the pregnancy and abortion contexts
are not perfectly analogous, this suggests that the Court would
130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) ("The pregnant woman cannot be
isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus. . . . [I]t is reasonable
and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of
health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The
woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be
measured accordingly.).
131. Id. at 162-65.
132. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
133. Id. at 874.
134. Id. at 877.
135. Id.
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disapprove of restrictions aimed at promoting the state's interest in the
fetus by directly undermining a woman's free choice in how to approach
labor and delivery. Furthermore, in Casey the Court said that Roe has
been properly understood also to protect a woman's decision to carry her
pregnancy to term, not simply her right to terminate a pregnancy, as they
both flow from protecting a woman's interest in deciding whether to bear
and beget a child. 136
The Court has recognized the paramount importance of a woman's
health starting with Roe,1 37 and this concern has shaped much of the
jurisprudence in this area. However, in the Court's most recent abortion
decision, Gonzales v. Carhart,138 the Court upheld a federal statute
restricting abortion procedures despite the lack of a health exception. In
doing so, the Court overruled its previous holding that where evidence
was divided on whether restrictions on a particular method would
endanger a woman's health (but there was evidence that danger to the
woman existed), the statute must then have a health exception. 9
Carhart is a devastating decision for advocates of reproductive freedom
because it not only whittles away at the guarantee of health exceptions
for the woman, but it also contains highly paternalistic language about
the health and interests of a pregnant woman seeking an abortion.14 0
Justice Kennedy's opinion is noteworthy for the extent to which it
disregards the role of scientific evidence in evaluating women's
136. Id. at 859 (citing, e.g., Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia County, 880 F.2d
305, 311 (11th Cir. 1989) (relying upon Roe and concluding that government officials
violate the Constitution by coercing a minor to have an abortion)).
137. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-65 (finding the "State does have an important and
legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman . . ." and
explaining that the government can go as far as prohibiting abortion after viability but
only if the law makes an exception for abortion necessary to protect a woman's health or
life).
138. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
139. Compare id. at 164-65 ("The medical uncertainty over whether the Act's
prohibition creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this
facial attack that the Act does not impose an undue burden."), with Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 937 (2000) (where evidence was divided on the safety implications of
banning a particular method of abortion, as long as there was proof of danger to the
woman's health the Court would require the statute to have a health exception because
"division of medical opinion about the matter at most means uncertainty, a factor that
signals the presence of risk, not its absence").
140. See, e.g., Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159-60 ("It is self-evident that a mother who
comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow
more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that
she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her
unborn child, a child assuming the human form."); see also id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("The solution the Court approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform
women, accurately and adequately, of the different procedures and their attendant
risks... . Instead, the Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice,
even at the expense of their safety.).
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experiences with abortion and the burdens of abortion restrictions. His
willingness to subordinate objective knowledge to subjective belief
informed by religious and moral values has alarming implications in the
context of birthing rights, where evidence-based practices supported by
scientific research are critical to challenging the increasing
medicalization of birth.14 1 One can argue that even under Carhart the
core decision-making aspect of the right to abortion remains, as does the
rule that the state may not restrict access to abortions that are "necessary,
in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health
of the mother."1 4 2 But it remains to be seen what impact Carhart will
have on future abortion cases. Even so, the fact that a fetus is not
recognized as a person under the constitution is clear, 14 3 which means
that a woman's constitutional status is superior to that of a fetus.144 That
said, any challenge in the near future would be heard by the same Court
(or a similarly balanced one) that demonstrated a willingness to
undermine Roe and Casey in the Carhart decision.145
Although the reproductive choice cases have been decided under
Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis, some commentators have
called for a reinvigoration of the doctrine with a sex equality line of
argument. Under this theory, the "social organization of
reproduction ... play[s] a key role in determining women's status and
welfare" 4 6 and "government may not entrench or aggravate these role
differences by using law to restrict women's bodily autonomy and life
opportunities in virtue of their sexual or parenting relations in ways that
government does not restrict men's." 1 47  Justice Ginsburg evokes this
notion in her Carhart dissent when she affirms that challenges to
restrictive laws "center on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's
course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature." 4 8 Such logic also
extends to the VBAC context, where women-unlike men-are specially
burdened by restrictive hospital policies requiring them to submit to
141. See, e.g., Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 ("While we find no reliable data to measure
the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their
choice. . . .").
142. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
143. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (holding that "the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn").
144. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 104, at 749.
145. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 191 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Though today's
opinion does not go so far as to discard Roe or Casey, the Court, differently composed
than it was when we last considered a restrictive abortion regulation, is hardly faithful to
our earlier invocations of 'the rule of law' and the 'principles of stare decisis.').
146. Reva Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 815 (2007).
147. Id. at 815-16.
148. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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medically unnecessary surgery or seek an alternative birthing location-
either a hospital some distance away or a homebirth.
B. Policy Concerns
In addition to the constitutional arguments against restrictive VBAC
policies, a number of strong policy concerns support the elimination of
such policies in favor of a woman's choice to give birth in the manner
most appropriate for her.
1. Future Pregnancy Risks
One important factor to emphasize in any challenge to VBAC
restrictions is that cesareans increase the risk of complications during
future births. When a cesarean is medically necessary, this heightened
risk in future pregnancies is simply an unavoidable consequence. The
trade-off between, on the one hand, the present need for medical
intervention for her own safety or to ensure a healthy birth and, on the
other, some unknown degree of risk during a hypothetical future
pregnancy is-with some exceptions-a relatively uncomplicated
decision for most women to make. But where the medical need for the
cesarean is less absolute and VBAC would present a potential option for
non-surgical birth, restricting a woman's ability to choose VBAC may
put her at an unacceptably much higher risk in the future. Each cesarean
increases the risk for the next pregnancy, and cesareans are generally not
recommended for women who plan to have more than two children. 149
Studies suggest that at least 1% of women with a history of more than
one cesarean will have an ectopic pregnancy, which is associated with
hemorrhage.150 A previous cesarean also increases the risk of placenta
accreta-when the placenta attaches itself too deeply to the wall of the
uterus-from one in 1,000 to one in 100."' Placenta accreta almost
always results in the need for a hysterectomy and the risk of massive
hemorrhage; as many as one in eleven babies and one in fourteen women
die as a result.'"2 Anecdotal accounts in the medical literature 53 suggest
149. See Song, supra note 10.
150. Myers, supra note 39, at 533 n.40 (citing E. Hernminki & J. Merilainen, Long-
Term Effects of Cesarean sections: Ectopic Pregnancies and Placental Problems, AM. J.
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 1569-74 (1996)).
151. Id. at 533 n.41 (citing H. Asakura & S.A. Myers, More Than One Previous
Cesarean Delivery: A Five-Year Experience with 435 Patients, 85(b) OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1569-74 (1996)).
152. Id. at 533 n.42 (citing J.M. O'Brien, The Management of Placena Percreta,
Conservative and Operative Strategies, 175(6) AM J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 924-
29 (1995)).
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that women recognize what physicians know-that "cesareans cast a
long shadow over the rest of a woman's reproductive life."'5 4
2. Deterrence
Restrictive VBAC policies also raise the specter that women will be
deterred altogether from giving birth in hospitals. Perceiving the hospital
setting as hostile to their desire to attempt VBAC, some women will opt
for homebirths or birthing centers that are not equipped to perform
emergency cesarean surgeries. The media recently reported the story of
a woman in Arizona whose local hospital has refused to support her
VBAC, even though she successfully delivered her third son vaginally
after the second was born by emergency cesarean-both at the very same
local hospital-suggesting both that she is a good candidate for VBAC
and that the hospital is equipped to perform emergency cesareans. 15 5
Unwilling to be coerced into an unnecessary cesarean, she will instead
drive 300 miles to Phoenix the week before her due date to be closer to a
hospital that will support her decision to deliver vaginally; her husband,
who was present at all three previous births but must stay behind to care
for their children and tend to the family business, is distraught by the
likelihood that he will not make the five hour drive in time to attend the
delivery.15 6 When they met with the local hospital's CEO, she threatened
to get a court order if necessary to ensure that the pregnant woman
delivered by cesarean surgery. 5 7 At the very least, even if restrictive
VBAC policies do not drive women away from hospital health care
completely, they run the risk of contributing to an adversarial
relationship between the doctor and patient, if the woman resents her
doctor for refusing to attend a VBAC or if the woman associates her
doctor with the hospital's policy banning VBACs. Good doctor-patient
relationships are the cornerstone of a functioning health care system, and
steps should be taken wherever possible to ensure that hospital policies
do not unnecessarily burden that relationship. In cases involving court-
ordered cesareans, surveillance is sometimes necessary to prevent
mothers from fleeing the hospital before the forced cesarean takes place,
153. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 9, at 2024 & n.369 (citing Medical Humanities
Report, Michigan State University, Winter 1984, at 1) (recounting the story of an African
woman and her husband who refused a cesarean in the face of their doctor's
dissatisfaction with her failure to progress in labor, resisting cesarean on the grounds that
it would place the woman at significant risk in future pregnancies because upon their
return to Africa they would have much less access to medical support).
154. Myers, supra note 39, at 539.
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transforming hospital staff into "obstetrics police."158 The high degree of
coercion present in many such cases has staggering consequences for
individual rights and perverse implications for increasing-rather than
reducing-the risk to the fetus.15 9  Dr. Flamm of UC Irvine, who has
expressed concern about women turning to midwife-assisted homebirths
after being denied the chance to try VBAC, has proposed that hospitals
find solutions to minimize the risk of deterrence-for example, by
adjusting their staffing schedules on the occasions when they have
VBACs in labor.' 60 Of course, this would not address the situation of
rural and community hospitals that do not have the degree of
158. See Rhoden, supra note 9, at 2028.
159. See, for example, Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'1 Reg'1 Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F.
Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999) for the story of a woman in Florida that provides a
particularly compelling example of how coercion in the birthing process can lead to
conditions of greater risk for both the woman and fetus. When Laura Pemberton was
unable to find an obstetrician who would attend her VBAC, she decided to deliver at
home. A day into the labor, with no signs of complications, she was worried about
becoming dehydrated, so she decided to go to the hospital to receive intravenous fluids
before returning home. The obstetrician on call refused to give her the IV unless she
consented to a cesarean; when Pemberton learned that the doctors intended to seek a
court-ordered cesarean, she fled the hospital in her bare feet out the back steps of the
hospital. She returned home was continuing to labor without complications, when the
sheriff and State Attorney came to remove her from her home-strapping her legs
together on a stretcher-to return to the hospital for a "hearing," where she was
unrepresented but a lawyer was appointed to represent the fetus. The judge ultimately
ordered the cesarean, subjecting both the woman and fetus to the risk of surgery, even
though the woman could feel the fetus progressing into her birth canal without
complication. She later left the state and went on to deliver four more children vaginally,
including a set of twins. See also Laura Pemberton, Address at National Advocates for
Pregnant Women's National Summit to Ensure the Health and Humanity of Pregnant and
Birthing Women (Jan. 18-21, 2007) (audio recording on file with NAPW).
In a case currently pending before the Florida First District Court of Appeal, a
woman is challenging a court order that required her to be confined indefinitely to
Tallahassee Memorial Hospital, forcing her to undergo any and all medical treatments
deemed necessary to save the fetus she was carrying. Samantha Burton had willingly
checked into the hospital after experiencing pregnancy complications, but after her
condition had stabilized and she expressed her readiness to leave, the hospital lawyers
went to court for an order that denied Burton the right to end her treatment at the hospital,
even denying her the right to transfer to a different hospital. Had the pregnancy gone to
term, Burton-a mother of two-could have been confined against her will in the
hospital for up to fifteen weeks. The order issued by the Circuit Court of Leon County
was so broadly worded that even after an emergency cesarean revealed a stillbirth-
rendering the ordered bed rest moot-Burton's lawyer had to secure an order allowing
Burton to be released legally from the hospital. Although the original circuit court order
is moot, Burton is asking the Florida First District Court of Appeal to rule the lower
court's actions unconstitutional in order to prevent the state from securing such broad
control over pregnant women who find themselves in similar situations in the future. See
Burton v. Florida, No. ID09-1958 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. filed Apr. 23, 2009); Brief for
American Civil Liberties Union, et al., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Burton v.
Florida, No. ID09-1958 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. filed July 31, 2009).
160. See Grady, Trying to Avoid, supra note 34.
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specialization that would make reshuffling staff schedules a useful
option, but it would represent a good-faith effort to try to prevent women
from going elsewhere to deliver under conditions of greater risk.
3. Insurance
In June 2008, the New York Times ran a story about insurers
refusing to offer individual coverage to women who have given birth by
cesarean surgery. 161 The justification for such discriminatory
rejections-which individual insurers are allowed to make on any basis
they wish, unlike insurers offering group coverage-was that a previous
cesarean increased the risk that these women would give birth by
cesarean again in the future, at greater expense to the insurance
company. 16 2 It is unclear exactly how many women have already been
affected by such policies, but with 18 million people seeking individual
health insurance and rising cesarean rates, this is an important factor to
include when analyzing implications of restrictive VBAC policies. More
cesareans lead to more cesareans and may put an increasing number of
women at risk of being unable to secure health insurance. Some
companies treat previous cesareans like other preexisting conditions.
Other insurance providers will cover women with previous cesareans but
only with increased premiums; for example, when Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Florida recently began to cover women with previous
cesareans, it charged a 25% increase in premiums for five years.163
Furthermore, the fact that some insurers ask about any previous coverage
denials and hold that against new applicants means that the consequences
of a medically unnecessary cesarean may persist long into the future.164
4. Equality Concerns
If the history of interventions into the reproductive lives of women
provides any guide, there is reason to fear that VBAC restrictions might
have a disproportionate effect on poor women, women of color, and non-
English speaking women. The historical antecedents of modern coercive
interventions during pregnancy include the forced sterilization of African
American, Latina, and Native American women, which have been
161. Denise Grady, After Cesareans, Some See Higher Insurance Cost, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/0I/health/0Iinsure.html.
162. Id. (referring to one woman's rejection letter explaining that if she had been
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documented in significant numbers through the 1970s.16 1 More recently,
women of color have been disproportionately subjected to forced
cesareans and surveillance of their behavior during pregnancy,
sometimes resulting in prosecution for the use of drugs or related
offenses.166  A 1987 study covering 45 states and Washington, D.C.
found that 80% of women subjected to court-ordered cesareans were
women of color (with African Americans accounting for 47% of the total
number of cesareans); only 20% of court-ordered cesareans were
performed on white women.16 7 Of the women who were forced to have
cesareans, 50% were unmarried and 27% spoke a language other than
English as their primary language; all of the cesareans were performed in
a teaching hospital or while the women were receiving public
assistance.168 Another study, published in the New England Journal of
Medicine, found that African American women were ten times more
likely to be screened and reported for substance abuse during pregnancy
than white mothers, although drug use levels were comparable for the
two groups.' 69  A recent study of new mothers found that African
American non-Hispanic women were the racial group most likely to have
given birth by cesarean surgery.170 Researchers believe that women of
low socioeconomic status are affected disproportionately by the practice
of defensive medicine, meaning the idea that physicians make deliberate
changes in their practice of medicine solely in order to avoid liability.171
Although unsupported by data regarding litigiousness, physicians seem
to be affected by a commonly-held belief that low-income patients are
more litigious towards their doctors;172 where this leads to higher rates of
cesarean surgery or other pregnancy interventions, low-income women
may suffer higher probabilities of adverse outcomes.
165. See Ehrenreich, supra note 6, at 498, 515.
166. See, e.g., id. at 516; Jeanne Flavin, OUR BODIES, OUR CRIMES: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF WOMEN'S REPRODUCTION (2009); Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug
Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALBt. L. REv. 999 (1999).
167. Ehrenreich, supra note 6, at 520-21 (citing Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-
Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1193 n.14 (1987)).
Admittedly, these statistics are old, but there does not appear to be more current research
in the area; there is also nothing to suggest that the underlying conclusions about the
disproportionate impact of coercive pregnancy interventions on minority and
disadvantaged women have changed in the last twenty years.
168. Id. (citing Kolder at 1193).
169. Id. at 520 (citing Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol
Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County,
Florida, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1202 (1990)).
170. Listening to Mothers II, supra note 58, Executive Summary at 8.
171. See Kim, supra note 83, at 98-99.
172. Id. at 99.
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Nationwide statistics on pregnancy-related deaths are unavailable
due to lack of consistency in record-keeping and categorization across
different state health departments, but in cities and states that regularly
analyze pregnancy-related deaths, the data suggest significant disparities
across racial groups.17 3 For example, in North Carolina from 1995 to
1999, 42 of every 100,000 black women died of pregnancy-related
causes, while the rate for white women was 12 deaths per 100,000.14 In
Florida between 1999 and 2002, there were 12.2 pregnancy-related
deaths per 100,000 white and Hispanic women and 38.1 per 100,000
black women.' Such racial disparities in pregnancy-related deaths have
been reported in cities as different as New York City and Jackson,
Mississippi. 176
With various studies concluding that there are differences in
treatment of pregnant and birthing women of different racial and ethnic
groups, there are a number of reasons to anticipate that women of color
and otherwise disadvantaged women might suffer disproportionately
under restrictive VBAC policies. First, the ability to advocate for an
attempted VBAC requires a certain level of education about birthing
methods. Women who cannot afford childbirth education classes or who
are not otherwise exposed to the range of options may lack the basic
information necessary to be able to advocate for the opportunity to try
VBAC. Second, women of lower socioeconomic status or whose
English skills are limited may feel disempowered to question medical
professionals about the availability of alternative birthing methods and
may feel reluctant to challenge medical authority. A long legacy of
dismissive and sometimes downright repressive treatment of poor
women and women of color by the medical establishment suggests that a
woman's fear of suffering consequences as a result of challenging
authority may have a legitimate basis. 177 A small study by Susan Irwin
and Brigitte Jordan found that middle-class women resist cesarean
173. See BLOCK, supra note 7, at 120.
174. Id. (citing Cynthia J. Berg et al., Preventability of Pregnancy-Related Deaths:
Results of a State-Wide Review, Obstetrics & Gynecology 106 (2005): 1228-34).
175. Id. (citing FLORIDA DEPT. OF HEALTH, PREGNANCY ASSOCIATED MORTALITY
REVIEW REPORT 1999-2002 (Tallahassee, 2005)).
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 6, at 514-19 (detailing historical examples of
how the medical profession has justified coercive behavior directed towards outsider
women). See also Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in
the Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REV. 487 (1992); Molly
McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing
Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 277
(1987-88); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right ofPrivacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419 (1991).
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surgeries more successfully than low-income women.17 8 Third, even
when a woman is sufficiently empowered and able to identify
alternatives to giving birth under a VBAC ban-such as traveling to
another hospital facility where VBAC is an option-her actual ability to
do this depends on having access to transportation and other resources to
enable a partner or family member to accompany her at the birth. These
barriers are even higher for poor women who live in rural areas with
fewer hospital options in the first place. Fourth, immigrant and other
minority women who come from cultural and religious backgrounds that
favor large families or oppose the use of birth control may find that
VBAC restrictions require them to choose between limiting their family
size against their wishes or putting themselves at increased risk for
complications in subsequent births. While this is not an exhaustive
treatment of the ways in which poor women and women of color may be
disproportionately harmed by VBAC restrictions, it does illustrate how
critical it is to understand how members of minority groups may
experience birthing policies differently from members of dominant social
groups. Such experiences should be reflected in legal arguments or
litigation strategies pursued, and the experiences of marginalized women
must be included when efforts to mitigate the effects of restrictive
policies are undertaken.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
This section will address a number of counterarguments likely to
arise in the course of challenging blanket VBAC restrictions. Many of
the points raised to justify VBAC restrictions are based in patriarchal
views of women held by members of the medical profession and by
society at large. As such, the arguments are at times closely interrelated,
and attempts to undermine one argument may also contribute to the
chipping away of another argument relied upon to justify restrictions on
pregnant and birthing women.
A. Birth is Just Diferent
Conversations about birth often focus on the idea that birth is
exceptional. The vocabulary used to describe the experience of giving
birth includes terms such as life-changing experience, transformative,
profound, spiritual, powerful, and indescribable. While the process of
giving birth may be all of those things and more, it is important to
distinguish the ways in which birthing is unlike other bio-medical
experiences and the ways in which it is simply a common physiological
178. See Ehrenreich, supra note 6, at 553 n.236.
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process that may require medical care, governed by the same rules of
informed consent, respect for human dignity and bodily integrity, and the
ethical rules of the medical profession as any other medical intervention.
The status of pregnancy has been characterized as unique for the
purposes of federal equal protection doctrine, on the basis that there are
no comparable categories for a relevant comparison of treatment. But a
challenge to restrictive VBAC policies does not address the treatment of
pregnant women in various social spheres but rather pertains only to the
availability of a particular form of routine medical care, the denial of
which unduly restricts women's ability to make decisions about their
bodies and families. We must reject the idea that pregnancy is sui
generis and that a different set of rules therefore apply. 17 9 Otherwise, the
subordination of a woman's choice about delivery method to third-party
judgments about what is best for her and for the fetus-judgments which
lack sufficient grounding in scientific evidence-risk transforming
women into "splendid Samaritans," expected to accept greater
restrictions on their liberty than society expects of other individuals. 80
B. Treating Two Patients
Advances in medical technology in the second half of the twentieth
century dramatically increased the amount of information about
individual fetal development available to physicians. Such technology
allows for more precise identification of developmental difficulties and
enables direct interventions in certain cases where fetal abnormalities can
be corrected in utero. As a result, there has been a concomitant shift in
how doctors treating pregnant women perceive their responsibilities to
their patients. A 1980 edition of an obstetrical textbook proclaimed:
"Happily, we have entered an era in which the fetus can be rightfully
considered and treated as our second patient. .. . We are of the view that
this is the most exciting of times to be an obstetrician. Who would have
dreamed-even a few years ago-that we could serve the fetus as
physician?"18' The National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development has recognized the complicated ethical dimensions of this
new era in pregnancy-related technology, observing that "[i]n the case of
cesarean delivery there are almost always at least two patients
involved-only one of which (the mother) may be able to speak for
179. See Nelson, supra note 104, at 719-20.
180. See Rhoden, supra note 9, at 1988.
181. See Finer, supra note 100, at 255 n.92 (quoting JACK A. PRITCHARD & PAUL C.
MACDONALD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS AT VII (16th ed. 1980)).
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herself."' 8 2 If a doctor believes that she is serving the fetus as a patient
separately from (and on par with) a pregnant woman patient, the chances
multiply that the doctor will order interventions that are more invasive
than the woman needs or wants. It is true that providing the best possible
care for a pregnant patient, while trying to ensure the birth of a healthy
baby, sometimes raises complicated questions about choices made in
childbirth. But there is danger that medical advances allowing more
involved monitoring and treatment of the fetus will lead to greater
coercion of women in childbirth, with physicians acting as "fetal
champions."1
This recalibration of the relationships between a pregnant woman,
her doctor, and her fetus raises several concerns. First, and perhaps most
fundamental, is the unconstitutional restriction on liberty a woman
experiences when the interests of a fetus trump her right to make
decisions about her body. 184  Furthermore, allowing technological
advances to elevate the legal status of the fetus for the purposes of
medical decision-making results in a situation where a pregnant woman's
constitutional rights "hinge[] on the status of medical science."1 85 Not
only would allowing medicine to dictate law shake the foundations of
our legal system, but the stability of core constitutional doctrines would
be undermined because the law would be subject to change whenever
new diagnostic achievements emerged. New medical technologies also
have notable flaws and limitations,' 86 which means there is a significant
grey area where medical intervention might be productive but a
physician would be unable to assess with any certainty whether a
problem exists or whether the proposed course of treatment would
address the problem. The tendency both to privilege medical authority
and to downplay women's inherent knowledge of their own bodies
suggests that women would be at risk of losing their rights whenever
they found themselves in one of these grey areas.
182. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, PUB. No.
82-2067, REPORT OF A CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE ON CESAREAN
CHILDBIRTH 465 (1981).
183. See Kim, supra note 83, at 82.
184. See supra Part III.A.
185. See Taylor, supra note 105, at 90 n.13. See generally, e.g., George Annas,
Predicting the Future of Privacy in Pregnancy: How Medical Technology Affects the
Legal Rights of Pregnant Women, 13 NOVA L. REV. 329 (1989); BARBARA KATZ
ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL
SOCIETY (1989); Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of
the Ideology ofMotherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist
Mindset of the Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1286-95 (1992).
186. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 9, at 2012-16 (describing the high rate of false
positives in the use of electronic fetal monitoring).
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The danger that medical advances in the realm of fetal monitoring
and treatment can serve as a "powerful rational for states to coerce
women to be selfless mothers"' 87 is not simply a hypothetical concern.
The availability of such technology has helped to reify the idea of a fetus
as an entity separate from the pregnant woman whose interests differ
from-and may even be diametrically opposed to-the interests of the
woman herself. The ideas have seeped into written commentary and
analysis in this area, as the title of this law review article illustrates:
"Maternal Abdominal Wall: A Fortress Against Fetal Health Care." 88
Not only is it insulting and offensive to women to perpetuate an analogy
between the nurturing work of pregnancy and constraining someone's
liberty by holding them prisoner, but this notion of an antagonistic
relationship between a woman and the fetus she carries has been adopted
by prosecutors who use child neglect and endangerment laws to police
pregnant women-to the detriment of both women and their children. 189
This trend aligns with (and in some cases grows out of) efforts on the
part of abortion opponents to strengthen the concept of fetal personhood
as a strategy for rolling back abortion rights.'90
In reality, the clashing interests are much less likely to be woman
and her fetus than they are to be woman and the state or woman and
hospital, often acting as an extension of the state. When Angela Carder
learned she had an inoperable lung tumor 25 weeks into her pregnancy,
she and her family decided to do whatever was necessary to keep her
alive.191 But hospital attorneys arranged for an emergency hearing
before a judge, who ruled in favor of the fetus-represented by
counsel-and ordered a cesarean surgery for Carder, who by that point
was breathing on a respirator and refused to consent to the cesarean.19 2
The baby only lasted two hours, and Carder died two days later.' 93 An
187. See Taylor, supra note 105, at 90 n. 13.
188. Jeffrey P. Phelan, The Maternal Abdominal Wall: A Fortress Against Fetal
Health Care, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 461 (1991).
189. See, e.g., In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1986); In re Baby X,
293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. App. 1980); In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Fam. Ct. 1985);
Johnson v. State, 602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); Reinesto v. Superior Court , 894 P.2d 733
(Ariz. 1995); State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003); State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d
1210 (Hawai'i 2005); Kilmon v. Maryland, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. 2006); Ward v. State 188
S.W.3d 874 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006). Although a number of these convictions were
overturned on appeal, women are nevertheless harmed by having their behavior policed
while they are pregnant. See also Nancy D. Campbell, The Construction of Pregnant
Drug-Using Women as Criminal Perpetrators, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 463, 474 (2006).
190. See, e.g., Electa Draper, Personhood Amendment on Nov. Ballot, DENVER POST
Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.denverpost.com/ci-9416032; Personhood '08 Colorado, a
Project of Colorado for Equal Rights, http://www.coloradoforequalrights.com.
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instance of woman-hospital conflict is the story of Amber Marlowe, who
had to travel to three separate hospitals while in labor before she found
one willing to let her deliver vaginally after an ultrasound suggested that
her baby was big. 194  The first hospital ignored her previous six
successful vaginal deliveries of large babies and told her she should find
somewhere else to give birth if she would not consent to cesarean
surgery; the second hospital delivered the same message but told her not
to leave, while in the meantime hospital attorneys petitioned a judge for
custody of the fetus so the hospital could legally compel a cesarean.195
She escaped to the third hospital in time to give birth vaginally without
complications. 196  Such stories illustrate how rhetoric about supposed
conflict between maternal and fetal interests may serve to obscure the
true conflict between a woman and the state, whose power might be
expressed by a judge, hospital, or individual doctors. We must not allow
birthing options to become limited by VBAC restrictions in a way that
reinforces the misguided notion that a pregnant woman and the fetus she
carries are two completely separate patients with different interests. The
risks to a woman's liberty are too great.
C. Special Duties ofMotherhood
One argument in defense of VBAC restrictions is that parents have
special duties towards their children and these duties extend to a
pregnant woman in relation to the fetus she carries. Such logic elides the
difference between a fetus and living child, a difference which is
recognized in law,1 97 even despite some concern for the rights of a fetus
in tort, criminal, and property law.1 98 Furthermore, it stretches the duty
of one individual to rescue or help another person beyond the scope
194. Id. at 252.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (holding that viable
fetus was not a "human being" for purposes of murder statute, though stillborn as result
of assault upon mother).
198. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (providing recovery
for tortious injury to viable fetus subsequently born alive); Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d
497 (1960) (recognizing right of live-born child to recover damages for injuries inflicted
upon it prior to birth); I. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (noting that an "infant in
ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be born for many
purposes). On the treatment of fetuses under wrongful death statutes, see, for example,
Dena M. Marks, Person v. Potential: Judicial Struggles to Decide Claims Arising from
the Death of an Embryo or Fetus and Michigan's Struggle to Settle the Question, 37
AKRON L. REV. 41 (2004); Mamta K. Shah, Inconsistencies in the Legal Status of an
Unborn Child: Recognition of a Fetus as Potential Life, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 931 (2001);
Lori K. Mans, Liability for the Death ofa Fetus: Fetal Rights or Women's Rights?, 15 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295 (2004).
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recognized by the law. The common law places a high value on freedom
from physical invasion or involuntary physical activity, including the
freedom to refuse to subordinate one's own preferences and needs to
another.' 99 There is no duty to assist someone in distress and certainly no
requirement that an individual risk life or limb to rescue another. 2 0 0 The
exceptions to this under the law of rescue are that one who injures
another has a duty to render aid and that someone who begins a rescue
must perform it with reasonable care and must not abandon the rescue if
it will leave the person in a worse position than before, neither of which
can be analogized to the cesarean context without stretching the
relationship between a woman and the fetus she carries beyond
recognition. Some special relationships, including that of a parent and
child, do impose a duty to rescue, but even when a duty to rescue exists,
there is no requirement that one risk life or limb to complete the
rescue. 20 1 In the few states that have created a statutory duty, the rescue
is required only if it poses no danger to the rescuer.202
Cases where medical treatment is mandated to save another are rare
and generally fall within the rescue doctrine's principle that there is no
legal duty to rescue others. In the leading case, McFall v. Shimp, 2 0 3 the
plaintiff sought to force his cousin to donate bone marrow. Initial testing
had established that the cousin was the only compatible match, but he
refused to undergo other testing-and the court refused to order the
treatment, finding that to do so "would change every concept and
principle upon which our society is founded." 20 4  There is also no
mandatory organ donation, even among family members.20 5 When a
thirty-three year old adoptee developed leukemia, he sought a court order
to open his adoption records and locate a compatible bone marrow
donor.2 06 The judge contacted the natural parents; the mother consented
to be tested and was not a match, but the father was unwilling to be
tested. The court's refusal to give the dying man his natural father's
name supports the conclusion that courts are reluctant to force even a
199. Nelson, supra note 104, at 753-54.
200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 315-19.
201. Id. See also, e.g., State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 786 (N.C. 1982) (finding
parental duty to rescue child in peril but no legal duty of parents to place themselves in
danger of death or great bodily harm in coming to the aid of their children).
202. See MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01.01 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 519(a)
(1967).
203. McFall v. Shrimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978).
204. Id.
205. See Rhoden, supra note 9, at 1978 (discussing judicial treatment of organ
donation among family members).
206. In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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parent to participate in an organ transplant to save his child's life.207
Compelled cesareans present a somewhat different scenario because of
the relationship of biological dependency between a woman and the fetus
she carries. But the legal conclusion that one person cannot be forced to
undergo medical treatment for the sake of another should hold just the
same-and actually carry even more strength because a fetus is not a
person under the law.
Defenders of court-ordered cesareans argue that a pregnant woman
has the obligation to rescue her fetus by submitting to surgery because
she is responsible for creating it and has accepted that responsibility by
choosing to carry the pregnancy to term.20 s Despite the visceral appeal
of a moral universe where people take seriously their responsibilities to
others, there are several problems with this argument, and with applying
the duty to rescue to pregnant women. First of all, it would be wholly
unreasonably to impute any such quasi-contractual obligation to women
in the absence of full abortion access, regardless of geographical
location, age, or ability to pay. Limited abortion access for some women
means that the decision to carry to term may not be made freely-or may
not constitute a choice at all. Second, the power to protect a fetus in
utero should not be stronger than the power to protect living individuals.
To require a woman to rescue her fetus by submitting to surgery would
radically restructure the duty to rescue: compulsory surgery far exceeds
the duties imposed on other rescuers. 20 9 Finally, legal duties are different
from moral obligations, and this is a particularly important distinction to
maintain in the birthing context, where it is relatively easy for a
physician to impose his moral judgment on a patient by disguising it as
medical advice. The law of rescue has exceptions that may fall within
the realm of morally reprehensible, but that does not make them legally
actionable.
D. Doctor Knows Best
The increasing medicalization of pregnancy over time has resulted
in greater physician control over the birthing process. As medical
207. Id. But see Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); Strunk v.
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (authorizing transplant of kidney from
incompetent child to sibling in order to save sibling's life, using a substituted judgment
test to assess what the incompetent person would have wanted to do). Contra Lausier v.
Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Wis. 1975) (declining to follow Strunk and holding that
court lacked power to permit removal of kidney from incompetent child to save brother's
life, even if risk posed was slight).
208. See, e.g., Finer, supra note 100, at 259.
209. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 9, at 1980 (illustrating this point with an analogy to
a person starting to rescue child in burning building who then realizes fire is worse than
thought and isn't required to still go in).
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anthropologist Emily Martin has observed, the "technological oversight
of birth in our culture [is] a process of production, where the physician,
not the woman, is clearly in control." 2 10  The medical model of
pregnancy and children repackages female reproductive processes as
pathological conditions,21 1 with childbirth "seen as a dangerous,
pathological, and unpredictable medical event." 2 12  While there is
undoubtedly value in being able to rely on a medical professional for
reassurance and expertise during the process of giving birth, an increase
in physician control of birth reduces a woman's power to control and
shape the process. The women's health movement has challenged this
shift in power, with groups such as the National Women's Health
Network, the Boston Women's Health Book Collective, and the National
Black Women's Health Project working to "expose the contingency of
the medical model of birthing and. . . set the stage for a reinterpretation
of the refusal of medical advice as resistance to prevailing forms of
social power." 2 13 But the perceived legitimacy of medicine is a powerful
disabling mechanism that keeps doctors, hospital staff, and judges from
being able to conceive of alternative explanations for why women might
214refuse cesareans. However, a close look at the scientific literature on
VBAC and repeat "elective" cesareans suggests the need to interrogate
further the sources of this perceived legitimacy. Existing research
reveals a striking lack of consensus about the risks and benefits of
different birthing methods-all of which cautions even more strongly
against subverting a woman's autonomy in birth with the force of
presumed medical authority.
One study that seems to have impacted attitudes towards VBAC is
the New England Journal of Medicine study discussed in Part I. The
study confirmed previous findings that the risk of uterine rupture during
a planned VBAC trial of labor is 0.5 to 1.0%, that induction without
prostaglandins may cause a slightly higher rupture rate, and that
"elective" repeat cesareans pose a lower risk of causing uterine rupture
but do not eliminate all risk.215 The study also found that the use of
210. Taylor, supra note 105, at 151 (quoting EMILY MARTIN, THE WOMAN IN THE
BODY: A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF REPRODUCTION (1987)).
211. See Ehrenreich, supra note 6, at 535 & n.169 (discussing EMILY MARTIN, THE
WOMAN IN THE BODY (1992); BARBARA K. ROTHMAN, IN LABOR: WOMAN AND POWER IN
THE BIRTHPLACE (1991)).
212. Id. at 536.
213. Id. at 538-39. See generally National Women's Health Network,
http://www.womenshealthnetwork.org; Boston Women's Health Book Collective,
http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org; National Black Women's Health Project,
http://www.blackwomenshealth.org.
214. See Ehrenreich, supra note 6, at 530.
215. Lydon-Rochelle, supra note 43.
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prostaglandins during induction increased the risk of uterine rupture to
2.5%, but it did not provide sufficient information about the
administration of the prostaglandins to conclude that their use in VBAC
is dangerous.216 Unfortunately, the NEJM study's reliance on birth
certificates and discharge data-without closer examination of medical
records or a determination of the prevalence of coding errors217-limits
its reliability. In a similar vein, a broader literature review undertaken by
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) concluded that
the medical literature concerning VBAC is flawed.218 Specifically, the
AHRQ identified an imprecise measurement of outcomes, lack of
standards for terminology, and limited attention to comparability
between groups as major limitations of the research on the risks and
benefits of VBAC.21 9 There is no direct evidence about the benefits and
potential harms of cesarean surgery compared with attempting a trial of
labor in women who are comparable for research purposes. 2 20 There is
no ambiguity in the AHRQ's assessment that the
deficiencies in the literature about the relative benefits and harms of
[trial of labor] versus [elective repeat cesarean delivery] are striking.
Patients, clinicians, insurers, and policymakers do not have the data
they need to make truly informed decisions about appropriate
delivery choices following one of the most common surgical
procedures performed on women.221
Physician attitudes about the risks of cesarean surgery reveal significant
disagreement about the wisdom of elective cesareans. A 2004 Gallup
poll of female obstetricians found that 36% report being unwilling to
perform a cesarean if not medically necessary, 32% would perform such
cesareans, and 28% say it depends on the circumstances.2 22 While this
polling did not ask about the choice between VBAC and cesarean, the
results do suggest notable variation in assessments about the wisdom of
performing medically unnecessary cesareans.
The relative uncertainty surrounding a range of birthing methods
and interventions is compounded by the maximin decision strategy in
American obstetrics. 223  The maximin strategy focuses on the worst
possible outcome in a situation of uncertainty and takes measures
216. See Flamm, supra note 46, at 277.
217. Id. at 276-77.
218. AHRQ Evidence Report, supra note 85, at vi.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 3.
221. Id. at vi.
222. See Song, supra note 10.
223. See Rhoden, supra note 9, at 2017 (citing Brody & Thompson, The Maximin
Strategy in Modern Obstetrics, 12 J. FAM. PRAC. 977 (1981)).
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necessary to prevent that outcome, regardless of its probability; in health
care management, it is considered a "pessimistic strategy." 224  One
example of this theory in practice is the routine use of electronic fetal
monitoring in low-risk pregnancies, despite documented inaccuracies in
predicting fetal distress and a high rate of false positives. 2 25  The
maximin approach also encourages an approach to cesareans referred to
casually as "when it doubt, cut it out." 22 6 Such invasive prenatal and
during-birth interventions may do as much--or more-harm than
good.227  Given that medical wisdom on the risks of various birthing
methods is still evolving, the best guiding principle for decisions where
reasonable scientific certainty is lacking should be the woman herself-
and her needs and wishes as she expresses them. The alternative birth
movement has recognized the value of facilitating births where women
drive the process; in doing so, it promotes the idea of pregnancy as a
"creative and purposive human activity," 228 rather than a situation in
need of medical intervention in order to be cured. Yet the medical
profession has increasingly sought to limit midwiveS229 and homebirth
proponents 230 from spreading their alternative perspectives on birthing.
As a result, the "unquestioned legitimacy of modern medicine
operates ... to obscure a conflict between the pathologizing view of
women and reproduction that contemporary physicians hold and a
competing vision of birthing that the alternative birth movement has
articulated." 2 3 ' The prevailing wisdom that doctors are best positioned to
control the birthing process, and that more medical intervention makes
224. YASAR A. OZCAN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT:
TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 52 (2005).
225. See Rhoden, supra note 9, at 2012-16.
226. See id. at 2022; Kim, supra note 83, at 82.
227. See Rhoden, supra note 9, at 2028. See also ICAN Fact Sheet, "Induction of
Labor," (discussing how medical interventions into childbirth frequently lead to further
interventions), http://ican-online.org/print/551.
228. Taylor, supra note 105, at 154 n.226 (discussing descriptions of pregnancy in
Hilda Lindemann Nelson, The Architect and the Bee: Some Reflections on Postmortem
Pregnancy, 8 BIOETHICs 247 (1994)).
229. See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, American Midwifery Litigation and State Legislative
Preferences for Physician-Controlled Childbirth, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 61 (2004);
Sara K. Hayden, The Business of Birth: Obstacles Facing Low-Income Women in
Choosing Midwifery Care After the Licensed Midwifery Practice Act of 1993, 19
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 257 (2004); Michael A. Pike, Restriction of Parental Rights to
Home Births Via State Regulation of Traditional Midwifery, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 609
(1997).
230. See American Medical Association, Resolution 205 (A-08), "Home Deliveries,"
(Apr. 28, 2008) (calling for legislation to ban home births without offering any science-
based information supporting the initiative); Luretha Senyo-Mensah, Criminalizing Home
Births in Georgia, COLLECTIVE VOICES, Vol. 2(8), at 21, available at
http://www.sistersong.net/documents/Collective -Voices _Vol2_1ssue8.pdf.
231. Ehrenreich, supra note 6, at 505.
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for a safer birth, must be refuted with an accurate (re)telling of the
facts-one that provides an accurate sense of how incomplete the data
really are.
V. CONCLUSION
Since ACOG issued its 1999 VBAC guidelines, the birthing
landscape in the United States has changed dramatically. Over 800
hospitals (and an unknown number of providers) have instituted new
restrictions on the ability of women to attempt to deliver vaginally after
previously having given birth by cesarean.2 32 These policies represent an
alarming contraction in the choices available to women when giving
birth. And the introduction of such restrictions has had a powerful effect
on birthing practices in the United States, with VBAC rates plummeting
from 23.4% in 1999 to just 10.6% in 2003.233 Many women, particularly
those in rural areas or those who lack the resources to travel to an
alternative VBAC-permissive hospital, now face a decision between
consenting to a repeat cesarean surgery-with all the risks that repeat
cesareans entail-or giving birth in a birthing center or at home, where it
would be even more difficult to secure medical intervention should
complications arise. VBAC restrictions pose an impermissible threat to
women's constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and
should be challenged as such.
The underlying rationale for restrictive VBAC policies-and for a
number of medical interventions into the birthing process-is based on
remarkably thin empirical evidence. Available data about the risks and
benefits of VBAC, as well as of repeat "elective" cesarean surgery, are
incomplete and provide an insufficient basis for the kind of wholesale
restriction on choice in childbirth that VBAC bans contemplate. Where
there are usable findings about VBACs and the risk of uterine rupture-
as in the New England Journal of Medicine study's data about the use of
prostaglandins during induction 234-there is not enough known
information to conclude that particular practices are dangerous. This
uncertainty in the data should make us more vigilant about preventing
physicians' subjective judgments-masquerading as professional
232. See International Cesarean Awareness Network, "Your Right to Refuse: What to
do if Your Hospital has 'Banned' VBAC Q&A," http://ican-online.org/vbac/your-right-
refuse-what-do-if-your-hospital-has-banned-vbac-q (last visited Nov. 25, 2009)
(reporting ICAN's survey results which reveal that over 800 hospitals across the United
States have instituted VBAC restrictive policies).
233. See supra Part I.B.
234. See Lydon-Rochelle, supra note 43.
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expertise-from eroding women's autonomy and dignity in birth.
Anything else "would. . . leave us far poorer as human beings."2 35
The potential for further whittling away of women's birthing
choices demands immediate attention to the issue of VBAC restrictions
and the development of a strategy for education and advocacy that will
restore and expand women's rights in childbirth. This need is even more
compelling in the face of other restrictions imposed on pregnant and
birthing women-from the arrest and civil confinement of drug-using
women to the shackling of female prisoners while giving birth to court-
ordered cesareans, as well as other formal and informal means of
controlling pregnant women's behavior. Restrictive VBAC policies that
compel women to undergo surgery-or else opt for a less safe or less
accessible location for giving birth-create space to justify other
measures that control women's behavior during pregnancy in the
interests of fetal welfare.
At least one commentator has called for advocacy groups to direct
resources towards litigation, as advocates have thus far been ineffective
at slowing the steady increase in cesarean rates. 2 36 But litigation alone
will not solve the problem. The complexity of the issues that have led to
the adoption of restrictive VBAC policies, combined with society's
largely uncritical acceptance of the medical establishment's authority,
suggest that advocates would be wise to supplement any potential
litigation with public education strategies.2 37 The protection of rights is
essential, but in the market for health care services, consumer awareness
is another critical key to preserving choice and should be considered a
component of a successful litigation strategy. Advocates would be wise
to exercise caution until the composition of the U.S. Supreme Court has
shifted, or at least until we know more about how Carhart will be
interpreted in a broader reproductive freedom context. In the meantime,
there is a plenty of work to do gathering information about the impact of
restrictive VBAC policies and other restrictions on pregnant women and
strengthening the reproductive justice framework in a way that situates
freedom in pregnancy and childbirth alongside other forms of
reproductive and sexual freedom. As George Annas, a Boston
University Professor of Health Law, Bioethics and Human Rights, has
observed, "The choice between fetal health and maternal liberty is laced
with moral and ethical dilemmas. The force of law will not make them
235. Nelson, supra note 104, at 763.
236. Myers, supra note 39, at 530-31 (arguing for antitrust litigation to challenge the
impact of ACOG's VBAC guidelines on the health care market).
237. See, e.g., Guide to a Healthy Birth, 2008-09 Edition, Choices in Childbirth,
available at http://www.choicesinchildbirth.org/birthguide/HealthyBirth_4b.pdf.
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go away."238 But law can help us protect and empower women whose
choices about how to give birth are overruled by the medical profession.
Law provides the guiding principles of liberty and autonomy that enable
us to create space for women to pursue the birth experiences that honor
and respect their humanity as mothers, as women, and as citizens.
238. George J. Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut of All, The
Hastings Center Report, 16, 45 (June 1982).
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